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 Development and Comparison of Two Alternate Display Formats for an AgendaManager 
Interface 
1. Introduction 
While advances in computer automation on modern commercial jet airliners has 
improved the fuel efficiency and cost effectiveness of transport aircraft, many new 
human-machine interaction problems and concerns have been identified (Funk, Lyall, & 
Riley, 1995). Among these concerns is the overall situational awareness of the aircrew in 
regards to the aircraft's automated systems, such as the autopilot with its many modes. In 
addition, according to a recent study by Boeing (1996), during the last ten years 60% of 
hull loss accidents involved the flightcrew as the primary factor, while only 12% of the 
accidents were due to the aircraft (airframe, systems, and powerplants). Thus, it is evident 
that the improved reliability of modern commercial jet transport aircraft due to advances in 
technology has shifted the primary accident causal liability of the system from a physical 
source (the aircraft), to the human operators of which a primary concern is the associated 
human-machine interface. 
A potentially valuable tool in improving the human-machine interface performance 
on the flightdeck would be to install a cockpit task management aid. Cockpit Task 
Management (CTM), is the management of a collection of tasks (or processes) that must 
be executed by the flightcrew and aircraft automated systems to complete a set of goals 
(Madhavan & Funk, 1993). Funk & Lind (1992) demonstrated improved pilot 
performance with a prototype task support system. Kim & Funk (1995), developed a low 
fidelity cockpit task management system using textual displays and found a significant 
increase in subject(s) task management performance. The promising results of that study 
led NASA to fund more extensive research into this area at Oregon State University using 
a higher fidelity flight simulator developed on Silicon Graphic workstations. 
Named AgendaManager, the aiding system uses information collected and inferred 
about the flightcrew's, aircraft automation's, and assorted systems' current and future 
state and goals (or agendas) to facilitate the management of flightdeck tasks.  The 2 
following thesis is a part of the aforementioned study, focusing on what, how much, and in 
what form, feedback from the AgendaManager should be presented to the flightcrew in a 
visual display. 
1.1 Statement of Problem 
Paramount to the success of any user aiding system is the design of the 
human-machine interface. According to O'Hare (pg. 33, 1990), "One of the heaviest 
burdens of science is to correct the misconceptions of common sense." Therefore, merely 
employing a little 'common sense' to the design of such a system display could conceal the 
possible benefits. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research were to: 1. perform a literature review of human 
factors display design principles relevant to this study; 2. construct a 'visual display 
development guide' from the aforementioned principles; 3. apply these guidelines to the 
design of two or more alternative AgendaManager displays presenting equivalent 
information; 4. compare the display designs by testing subject task management 
performance on a part-task flight simulator; 5. develop recommendations for the final 
display to be used for the evaluation of the AgendaManager. 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter 2 consists of the required background information necessary for 
understanding this thesis. This includes basic cockpit task management theories, the 
AgendaManager cockpit task management system, and a description of the role of 
automation in cockpit task management. 
The selection and scope of AgendaManager information required by the flightcrew 
is the focus of chapter 5. Chapter 5 is a collection of related cognitive and perceptual 3 
issues related to visual display design and the compilation of a 'visual display development 
guide'. Chapter 6 of the thesis describes the AgendaManager display development 
process and the displays developed for this study. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the experimental method employed for this study including 
the flight simulator, function of the AgendaManager, display(s) architecture, flight 
scenarios and the experimental design. Chapters 8 and 9 will contain the experimental 
results, conclusions, and recommendations for the final AgendaManager interface design 
to be used in the AgendaManager system evaluation. 4 
2. Background Information 
2.1 Introduction 
From the beginning of 1959 through December 31, 1995, there were 304 million 
world-wide commercial jet departures (not including former east-block nations for which 
reliable statistics do not exist). During the first twenty years of this period accident rates 
dropped from around 60 accidents per million departures by more than an order of 
magnitude before leveling off to around 3 accidents per million departures (Boeing, 
1996). At this high level of safety the yearly number of airline fatalities in the United 
States is less than a week's total of traffic fatalities on the nation's highways (O'Hare & 
Roscoe, 1990). However, as depicted in figure 2.1, both world-wide and domestic 
commercial transport accident rates have remained fairly steady showing little, ifany, 
recent improvement. 
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Figure 2.1 Annual accident rates of worldwide commercial jet fleet 
from Boeing (1996) 5 
Wiener & Nagel (1988) credit much of the initial reduction in accident rates to 
technological advancement, particularly the increased reliability of aircraft subsystems. 
Extremely low commercial aircraft subsystem failure rates have made catastrophic  failures 
(i.e. engine) quite rare during the operation of modern aircraft (Stewart, 1992).  While 
technology may have reduced the probability of subsystem failures, increasing airline 
safety, most of the fatal commercial passenger aircraft accidents during the past decade 
were attributed to the flightcrew (Boeing, 1996). This tendency towards a human source 
for the majority of a system's failures, although alarming, is simply part of the natural life-
cycle of any system when the state of its associated technology advances (Wiener & 
Nagel, 1988). 
Human Causes 
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Figure 2.2 Trends in the causes of system accidents over time (Wiener & Nagel, 1988) 6 
With the number of world-wide commercial aviation passengers steadily 
increasing (Boeing, 1996), yearly passenger deaths without any accident rate improvement 
would increase to what national aviation leaders consider "intolerable" levels (FAA, 
March 1995, p. 5). In addition, while the relative safety of commercial air transportation 
may be high, the graphic and public nature of air transport accidents magnifies public 
perceptions of risk (Hawkins, 1993). Clearly, anything less than a dramatic increase in the 
safety of future commercial aircraft systems will produce unacceptable loss of life and 
serious damage to the public's image of commercial air transport. While the 'human' cost 
of these consequences may be difficult to define, the monetary cost to commercial air 
carriers, insurance companies, families, and the government, would undoubtably be quite 
substantial. 
2.2 Aviation Safety & Human Factors 
The overall consensus in the aviation safety community is that the human 
component of this highly developed aviation system is the major source of failure 
(Madhavan, 1993), thus, any further effort to dramatically improve system safety must 
address the 'human factor' of system operation. The field of research dedicated to 
addressing user interaction with systems has been referred to as both ergonomics and 
human factors, though in this work it will be referred to only as human factors. 
Sanders and McCormick (1993) define human factors in terms of its focus, 
objectives, and approach. Its focus is the interaction of humans, machines, and the 
environment. Design objectives range from improving system performance to increasing 
operator safety, and the approach towards these objectives is both systematic and 
scientific. While the fine details in the definition of human factors may vary, the main 
theme of the topic is the same: reduction of user error and the improvement of efficiency 
(Wiener, Helmreich, & Kanki, 1993). 
The characteristics of commercial jet aircraft systems require special design 
considerations by human factors engineers since these systems are amazingly complex, 
consequences of system failure extremely high, and both constant and vigilant operator 
attention is required. Therefore, a primary goal of an aviation system human factors 7 
engineer is the elimination of errors committed by the 'human factor', commonly referred 
to as 'pilot error'. 
Numerous categorization and grouping systems have been developed for human 
and/or pilot errors (O'Hare & Roscoe, 1990). Wickens (1992) and Reason (1990) 
describe information processing models of human error consisting of mistakes, slips, 
lapses, and mode errors. 
A mistake is made when the operator makes an improper situational assessment or 
develops an improper plan of action, thus executing the wrong response. Slips occur 
when the system user develops a correct assessment and intends to enact the correct 
response, but simply commits an error during the response. An example of a slip would be 
the activation of the wrong control lever which happens to be positioned next to the 
correct lever by a system user, even though the operator intended to activate the correct 
lever. Lapse and mode errors are both memory errors. In the first case an operator 
merely forgets to execute the response, and in the latter the operator carries out the proper 
response, but for a different situation. 
Reason (1990) classifies error types in relation to their cognitive stage. In his 
scheme a mistake relates to the planning cognitive stage, a lapse is due to failures in the 
storage (or memory) stage, and a slip is related to errors made in the execution cognitive 
stage. Although these models are interesting, their use in the direct understanding of 
operator error committed in an aircraft cockpit is limited. 
A more applicable and more useful model of the role of human factors and pilot 
error in system design and performance is the SHEL concept (Hawkins, 1993). SHEL 
stands for Software, Hardware, Environment, and Liveware. Liveware refers to the 
human user and is the center of the model. The model is depicted in figure 2.3 and is 
concerned with the interface between humans and hardware, humans and software, 
humans and the environment, and the interpersonal interfacing between humans. 8 
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Figure 2.3 Shel diagram from Hawkins (1993) 
The hardware in a commercial jet cockpit and the surrounding environment are 
essentially constraints for this work. Therefore, the liveware-hardware (or L-H) and 
liveware-environment (L-E) interfaces, while beyond the direct scope of this thesis, will 
impose certain design limitations (i.e. color coding schemes) that are discussed later. 
Since the flight simulator environment used for this study was operable by only one 
subject, the liveware-liveware interfacing that comprises the core of crew resource 
management (CRM), a major human factors aviation issue, is not directly addressed. 
Liveware-software interface concerns are the main focus of this thesis 
development. These concerns deal with the content, symbology, and format used to 
display information to the system user. Two display systems were developed to display 
equivalent information and they were compared to each other by measuring an important 
component of pilot error termed cockpit task management/agenda management. 
2.3 Cockpit Task & Agenda Management 
The introduction of automation into the cockpit has transformed the role of the 
pilot from that of system operator to system monitor and manager (Wiener & Nagel, 
1988). Flightdeck tasks previously performed by the pilots are now being performed by 
modern commercial aircraft automated systems and monitored by humans (Wiener & 9 
Curry, 1980). The performance of flightcrews on modern commercial jet aircraft now has 
as much to do with task management as with proper task execution (Chou et. al., 1996). 
Funk (1991) developed a terminology describing the management of cockpit tasks 
on a flightdeck naming it cockpit task management (CTM). The principle definitions 
involved in CTM must be described before its theoretical concepts can be presented. Funk 
(1991) defines a task as "a process that is completed to cause a system to achieve a goal." 
(p. 275, a goal as a "set of desired behaviors." (p. 273) and an agenda as "a hierarchy of 
tasks to be completed." (p. 275). The management of cockpit tasks is determined by the 
status of system tasks, and the behavior (input, state, and output over time) of the system 
and subsystems. A system's state is defined as a "set of system attributes at a given time" 
(p. 272) and significant changes in a system's state are labeled events. 
According to (Chou et. al., 1996), errors in cockpit task management can occur 
during task initiation, prioritization, and termination. The initiation of a task could be 
early, incorrect, late, or simply not occur, and the termination of a task could be early, 
incorrect, late, or lacking. 
Table 2.1 CTM taxonomy from Chou et. al. (1996) 
Error Categories  Possible Classifications 
Task Initiation  Early 
Late 
Incorrect 
Lacking 
Task Prioritization  Incorrect 
Task Termination  Early 
Late 
Incorrect 
Lacking 10 
Any task managed in an agenda can occupy one of five distinct  states. A task can 
be latent, and then just before the activation of its goal become pending. When the 
triggering event develops, a task then becomes active and is considered active-in-progress 
when system resources are allocated towards the completion of the task. Finally, a task is 
terminated when its corresponding goal is accomplished, unattainable, or no longer 
required for the operation of the system. 
Using the CTM terminology, Chou (1991) studied the role of cockpit task 
management in accident reports published by the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB). He determined that in 23 percent (76) of 324 accidents studied, cockpit task 
management errors were apparent. Madhavan (1993) analyzed 470 NASA Aviation 
Safety Reporting System reports and found CTM errors in 49 percent (231) of them. It is 
clear that cockpit task management is an important factor in aviation safety. 
Kim (1994) developed a low fidelity flight simulator and integrated it with a 
cockpit task management system (CTMS) using a color and indent coded three-tiered 
textual display to present upcoming, in-progress, and suggested tasks. Using eight 
subjects to collect data he found significant mean CTM performance improvement in task 
completion (82%), prioritization (41%), and initiation (18%). Aircraft control 
performance was also markedly improved by 24%. This initial study demonstrated the 
possible benefits of even a simple memory aid in cockpit task management, albeit in a 
laboratory setting and with a low fidelity flight simulator. 
The performance of cockpit tasks by automated systems, inducing a string of 
recent incidents and accidents attributed to the human/machine interface (Learmount, 
1995), led Funk to a modification to the existing CTM terminology (Funk & Kim, 1995). 
A better representation the activities executed on the modern flightdeck was the purpose 
of this revision. This modification was termed Agenda Management, and the cockpit task 
management system developed utilizing this architecture referred to as the 
AgendaManager. 11 
2.4 The Agenda Manager 
The terminology used for the Agenda Manager is equivalent to that of CTM theory 
with the following exceptions. A function is now defined as a process or activity 
performed to cause a system or subsystem to achieve a goal. An actor (pilot, co-pilot, 
automated system) executes flightdeck functions, and a task is a function performed by a 
human (Funk & Kim, 1995). 
Functional modeling methodologies were used to perform a functional analysis on 
the many activities that occur during a commercial transport mission. Once a generic 
commercial air transport mission was decomposed, a more detailed analysis of how the 
`perform flightdeck activities' function was developed with the AgendaManager system as 
one of the mechanisms accomplishing part of the transport mission. The activities in table 
2.2 and their definitions that involve the AgendaManager are based on work by Funk & 
Kim (1995). 
Table 2.2 Agenda management activity hierarchy 
AO perform flightdeck activities: The accomplishment of activities performed during the 
operation of a commercial transport aircraft from its flightdeck. 
AI manage agendas: Management of the actors' agendas. 
All manage individual agendas: Management of the agenda of each actor. 
A111 manage goals: The activation and termination of recognized 
and inferred goals. 
A112 manage functions: The initiation, assessment, prioritization, and 
termination of functions to achieve the associated goals. 
Al2 share agenda information: The communication of agenda information both 
overtly and covertly between the actors. 
A2 perform other functions: The performance of other functions to achieve the 
mission goals. 
A21 coordinate actors: The coordination of the activities of actors assigned to 
to the performance of functions. 
A22 assess function: The assessment of the status ofa function.
 
A23 maintain situation models: The integration of current status information to
 
update respective actor situation models.
 
A24 decide/plan: The planning of future goals and functions and the decisions
 
regarding the performance of current activities.
 
A25 act: Actions leading towards the accomplishment of goals.
 12 
This hierarchy formed the basis for the Agenda Manager architecture, acting as a 
blueprint with the primary objective of the AgendaManager being node Al, managing 
agendas. This incorporates the management of each individual actor's agenda (node All) 
while regarding the other actors' agendas by sharing agenda information (node Al2). 
The core of the AgendaManager architecture includes system, actor, goal, 
function, and agenda agents (Funk & Kim, 1995). Agenda agents maintain awareness of 
the actor's goals and functions. This declarative and procedural knowledge includes goal 
prioritization information, and the detection of conflicts between goals or functions. Each 
aircraft system (i.e. electrical) has a system agent that maintains information concerning its 
past, present, and future state and status. The state represents some value (e.g. 25 amps), 
while the status would inform the AgendaManager whether the state value is satisfactory, 
marginal, or unsatisfactory. Function agents keep track of the function's status and state 
and retrieve necessary information from system agents. The goal agents (each one has a 
corresponding function agent) use this information to evaluate each goal state and assign 
each a priority. Actor agents keep track of state information concerning each actor and its 
agenda. The associated agendas are tracked through explicit goal communications (part 
of the AgendaManager interface), and implicit knowledge attained through an expert-
system (outside the scope of this thesis) that infers pilot intent. 
Information presented to the pilot through the AgendaManager display should 
directly effect agenda management performance, limit scope to avoid information 
overload, and be compatible with the display format(s) chosen (e.g. text). The appropriate 
information to be displayed should be described in both a broad and detailed scope to be 
applied effectively in the determined context(s) and format(s). Chapter 4 of this thesis 
describes this process. 
2.5 Problem Statement 
As previously mentioned, Kim's CTMS (1994) used a simple text based display to 
present cockpit task management information to subjects in a study that showed promising 
results. While textual display formats are an effective means of communicating 
information, several studies (Legge et. al., 1989; Morris et. al., 1985) have suggested that 13 
the incorporation of graphics in coded displays can significantly improve subject 
performance. 
Textual displays like Kim's have the inherent advantage of being able to present a 
large amount of information to a system operator, but since words and statements must be 
recoded, or processed, by the viewer (Sanders & McCormick, 1993) the implementation 
of alternative or graphical components to the AgendaManager display could improve 
reaction time, and thus, performance. The implementation of alternative cues to present 
agenda management knowledge to the pilot may also decrease errors since it has been 
demonstrated that items in a textual display can be confused with each other (Sanders & 
McCormick, 1993). 
Kim also presented all task types in the same general way, ignoring the possible 
benefits of presenting different types of goals in differing ways. Given the demonstrated 
performance liabilities with purely textual displays, it may be more efficient to present 
some goal information in a textual format, and other knowledge using an alternative 
scheme. In addition, cockpit task management information was presented by Kim in a 
single display, which in a real-world cockpit could only be part of a secondary grouping. 
Acquiring and maintaining the attention of a pilot with a secondary display is unlikely and 
potentially a hazard during high risk situations. The identification of alternate display 
formats that are at least partially implemented within the space available on primary flight 
displays could not only improve subject agenda management performance in the 
laboratory, but also give a more realistic impression of how such an agenda management 
system might work in an actual cockpit. 
Finally, while Kim's display was not ad hoc, it was also not based on a 
comprehensive literature review of human factors visual display design principles. The 
application of such principles to the design of agenda management aids could significantly 
improve subject agenda management performance. 14 
3. Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research were to: 1. perform a literature review of human 
factors display design principles relevant to this study; 2. construct a 'visual display 
development guide' from the aforementioned principles; 3. apply these guidelines to the 
design of two or more alternative AgendaManager displays presenting equivalent 
information; 4. compare the display designs by testing subject task management 
performance on a part-task flight simulator; 5. develop recommendations for the final 
display to be used for the evaluation of the AgendaManager. 15 
Chapter 4 - Information Requirements 
4.1 Introduction 
The primary focus of this thesis is node Al2 on the perform flightdeck activities 
activity hierarchy (see table 2.2). Termed 'share agenda information', this activity 
involves the communication between AgendaManager actors about their corresponding 
agendas. Information would be presented to the human agent (pilot) visually on one or 
more displays. However, before any displays could be developed, the information content 
needed by the pilot to efficiently manage the flightdeck was determined. This chapter 
focuses on the level, scope, and substance of agenda management information to be 
displayed to the pilot. 
4.2 Information Requirements 
Results of the perform flightdeck activities functional analysis of AgendaManager 
activities were described in chapter 2, and in conjunction with computer code developed 
by the Oregon State University Human Factors Engineering Group, forms the scope of 
agenda information that could be presented to the pilot. First the broad context of 
information to be displayed was determined, then the elements of this context were 
decomposed into a more detailed and descriptive format. 
A functional analysis is useful for determining the high-level scope of information 
to be presented. Once this scope was defined, a decomposition of the computer code 
provided the details and clarified any potential quantitative or qualitative characteristics of 
the information that may aid cockpit agenda management. Since display space was 
limited, the applicability and direct usefulness towards agenda management of the 
information derived from the functional analysis and computer code determined the 
probability that particular agenda knowledge was included in the respective display 
format. 16 
4.2.1 High-Level Scope of Information 
The following is a hierarchy of information derived from a functional analysis of 
agenda management performed by Funk and Kim (1997). Represented are most of the 
major groups of information about agenda management applicable to the current version 
of the AgendaManager that could be presented to the pilot. Decomposing and describing 
this knowledge into logical subsets provided useful insight into the possible display 
formats that could enhance cockpit agenda management performance. 
Table 4.1 Potential AgendaManager information 
1. Shared Agenda Information 
a. Managed Goals : Prioritized active and inactive goals. 
b. Managed Functions : Prioritized and active functions. 
1. Actor Roles and Responsibilities : Actor roles and responsibilities 
involved in the performance of the function. 
2. Function Status Assessments : The Assessment of a function's status. 
2. Goal Information 
a. Active Goals : Goals that have been activated to which resources 
should be applied 
1. Prioritized Active Goals : Goals that are prioritized and active. 
a. Derived Goals : Subgoals generated from other goals, including 
explicitly declared goals. 
b. Inferred Goals : Goals inferred from state information. 
b. Pending Goals : Goals that have yet to be activated. 
1. Derived Goals : Subgoals generated from other goals, including 
explicitly declared goals. 
2. Inferred Goals : Goals inferred from state information. 
c. Goal Faults : Deficiencies attributed to goals, for example, two goals that have 
conflicting aims. 
3. Function Information 
a. Active Functions : Functions that have been activated with which resources 
should be applied. 
b. Function Status Information : Information from the assessment of a function's 
status. 
c. Function Faults : Deficiencies attributed to functions, for example, functions 
that have been misprioritized. 17 
The entire scope of agenda management information to be presented to the pilot is 
contained in the first section of table 4.1, 'shared agenda information'. Encompassed 
within this information are both managed goals and functions. Each goal has an 
associated function, and likewise, each function has an associated goal. Since the amount 
of information that can be processed by the pilot is limited and dependent upon the display 
format used, it would be useful to estimate the relative importance of each subset of 
AgendaManager information in the context of its effective value towards agenda 
management. 
Goal information forms the primary component of useful agenda management 
information. This information consists of inferred, pending, prioritized active, and derived 
goals along with any associated conflicts. The information with the highest near-term 
value is likely the 'goal fault' information, especially goal conflicts. For effective agenda 
management a pilot must be aware of any conflicting goals, for example, with the aircraft 
system's autopilot. If the pilot is not aware of a goal conflict with another actor on the 
flightdeck he could make decisions and take actions that jeopardize the safety of the 
aircraft. This occurred on April 26, 1994, in Nagoya, Japan, during approach when the 
first officer of a China Airlines A300-600 failed to realize that the autopilot was 
attempting a go-around by adjusting pitch with the trimmable horizontal stabilizer while he 
was trying to land the airplane. According to the Japanese Ministry of Transport (Aircraft 
Accident Investigation Commission, 1996), the resulting accident killed 249 of 256 
passengers and all 15 crewmembers. 
A representation of current prioritized active goals would also be of high value to 
the pilot, increasing awareness of the current activities needing to be performed on the 
flightdeck. Included in the prioritized active goals list are both inferred and derived goals. 
Derived goals are generated by decomposing the mission goal, and when involving the 
pilot, may be explicitly declared through some verbal or alternate means. Inferred goals 
are constructed by an encoded expert-system logic mechanism from information contained 
in aircraft state variables. A way for the pilot to distinguish between declared and inferred 
goals may be an important asset for agenda management, but should only be incorporated 18 
if spatial limitations allow. In addition, pending goals could be displayed to enhance pilot 
awareness of future possibilities. 
Functional information, by definition, is more procedural in nature. It comprises 
the action(s) an actor agent must take in order to achieve a desired state. Since each 
function is derived from a goal, an actual listing of current active functions or function 
faults would be redundant. Therefore, the most important aspect of function information 
that can be presented to the pilot is its assessed status, which by its nature reflects the 
current and future state of the function with respect to its goal. 
For example, if the pilot's goal was to climb to 9000 feet (he is currently cruising 
at 4000 feet), the function agent's status with respect to that goal would be dependent 
upon the attitude of the aircraft. If the aircraft is climbing at a sufficient rate, the function 
agents status would be satisfactory, if not, unsatisfactory. 
4.2.2 The Details 
As noted earlier, each actor in the AgendaManager architecture maintains an 
agenda. An actor's agenda is comprised ofa group of goals and associated functions 
(activities performed to achieve the goals) ordered according to an assessed priority with 
the resources assigned to complete each function. To represent the objects that comprise 
agenda 'agents' in the Smalltalk programming environment data-sets (known as objects) 
with associated instance variables were developed. 
Instance variables characterize object states or qualities (Skublics et. al., 1996) and 
make up the data of any AgendaManager agent. Since goal and function information are 
what is to be displayed to the pilot, the instance variables from the GoalAgent and 
FunctionAgent classes are the sources of this information. Table 4.2 contains a listing of 
the instance variables described on the paragraphs following that were used by the goal 
and function agent classes. 19 
Table 4.2 Goal and function agents as defined in computer code instance variables 
Class Name  Instance Variables 
Goal Conflict  goalAgents 
Goal Agent  name source origin priority state satisfied 
Function Agent  name supervisor state priority currentStatus futureStatus status 
currentStatusComment futureStatusComment 
Presenting all of this data would quickly overload a pilot in an already information 
rich environment. In addition, display formats differ in the amount of information they can 
effectively present to the pilot. Since the knowledge contained within the instance 
variables of the GoalAgent and FunctionAgent classes would be of varying practical use to 
the pilot, this information should be prioritized according to its potential usefulness to the 
pilot in the context of agenda management. 
When classifying the relative importance of agenda information to the pilot, the 
overall nature or type of task should be considered. For the purpose of this study, goals 
are classified as either subsystem (e.g. electrical system) or aircraft (e.g. heading) goals. 
The reasoning behind this classification scheme is as follows. 
Depending on the type of goal (subsystem or aircraft), its name, for example 
`maintain 10000 ft', would be of high value to a pilot managing an agenda. This 
descriptive knowledge is of the highest importance for 'aircraft', or constantly present 
goals such as aircraft heading, altitude, and airspeed since an instance of each of these 
goals is present throughout the mission. 
Subsystem agent goals are much less common during a mission, limited in their 
possible scope, and are typically described by alternate external cues such as caution and 
warning lights and sounds not on the 'glass cockpit' flight displays. Although goal names 
would provide valuable information to the pilot about subsystem agent goals like 'restore 
fuel pressure', in a display format with limited space a simple queuing mechanism could 
suffice. 20 
For example, only a few types of faults such as a pump or fuel heater failure are 
plausible within a fuel system, while there are virtually an unlimited number of 
combinations of aircraft goals (i.e. altitude goals of 8000 ft, 9000 ft etc.). Modern graphic 
system displays provide information concerning potential goals through theirown coding 
mechanisms, such as a fuel pump symbol turning red if it has failed. A well trained pilot 
that has been directed to a subsystem agent display will likely know the problem and the 
correct procedure to follow from a quick glance at the display. Information regarding the 
goal agent's function agent name would be redundant and is of limited value. 
A goal's priority is important since a pilot should usually devote more attention to 
higher priority goals and their functions for effective agenda management. A pilot 
expending resources on a low priority problem, while a higher priority life threatening 
problem exists, is clearly exhibiting poor agenda management. For most display formats, 
the goal agent's priority should be displayed to the pilot in a coded form regardless of 
display type. A function's priority is well represented by its goal's priority and would be 
redundant information if presented. 
The source of each goal (e.g. ac electrical system) is important information for 
agenda management and should be either stated directly through some type of coding, or 
presented spatially with goals presented in certain locations belonging to a particular actor 
agent. Along with source, the state of each goal (whether active, pending, or terminated) 
should be presented to the pilot but in a spatial fashion since mixing active, pending, and 
terminated goals in one area could easily cause confusion. All active goals must be 
presented to the pilot in some fashion, and pending goals could be presented if space 
allows. Displaying terminated goals would likely only waste valuable display space. 
A goal agent's origin (explicit or inferred) was discussed in the previous section. 
Displaying this goal attribute might be of value since there is a chance that a goal could be 
incorrectly inferred. However, given the spatial constraints of the display and the fact that 
this distinction is of most value to the inner logic mechanisms employed by the 
AgendaManager, inclusion of this data should be given a low priority due to the slim 
chances of an occurrence. 21 
Encoded into each goal displayed should be the goal agent's function agent status. 
While the intricacies of this relationship do not need to be considered by the pilot, a goal 
agent's function agent status will indicate if progress towards the completion of the goal is 
satisfactory, marginal, or unsatisfactory. Goals whose function agent status is 
unsatisfactory or marginal are an indicator of poor agenda management and a potential 
safety concern. 
The relationship between goal and function agents is quite intricate.  Details of this 
association should not be required knowledge for the pilot due to potential mental 
processing requirements. When two function and goal agent instance variables are similar 
in nature (even though their small differences are important to the underlying 
AgendaManager logic), only the most informative one should be presented. Displaying 
whether a goal agent is satisfied may cause pilot confusion with a goal agent's function 
agent status. Since the latter presents better information to the pilot, only it should be 
displayed. 
A function agent's current and future status are both adequately described by 
information derived from its status. If both the current and projected future status of a 
function are satisfactory, its status is satisfactory. If either the current or projected future 
status of a function is unsatisfactory, then the function's status is considered marginal. 
Finally, if both the current and projected future status of a function are unsatisfactory, its 
status is unsatisfactory. The following table illustrates this relationship. 
Table 4.3 The relationship between current, future, and overall status 
Current Status  Future Status  Overall Status 
satisfactory  satisfactory  satisfactory 
satisfactory  unsatisfactory  marginal 
unsatisfactory  satisfactory  marginal 
unsatisfactory  unsatisfactory  unsatisfactory 22 
Current and future status comments could be used to describe what is perceived to 
be causing an unsatisfactory or marginal status rating, or used to explain the action needed 
to correct a current goal fault. Implementation of this message could be undertaken on a 
case by case basis, providing the most useful message for each individual goal. 
A goal conflict, part of the goal faults information, is represented in Smalltalk code 
by the GoalConflict class. An instance of this class contains the two goal agents which 
comprise the goal conflict. The priority of the information presented to the pilot about 
these goal agents would be roughly similar to the aforementioned ranking of goal 
information. In general, the goal names and sources must be displayed, with other 
information presented where space allows. 
All other instance variables included in the aforementioned classes pertain more to 
the inner-workings of the AgendaManager than to information the pilot could easily use or 
process for effective agenda management. Table 4.4 on the following page lists the 
information described in the preceding paragraphs, along with relative importance ratings 
of high, moderate, and low. 23 
Table 4.4 Agenda Manager information content list 
Class or Instance Variable 
Goal Conflict goalAgents 
Goal Agent name 
Goal Agent name 
Function Agent name 
Goal Agent and Function Agent supervisor 
Goal Agent priority 
Goal Agent priority 
Function Agent priority 
Goal Agent source 
Goal Agent state 
Goal Agent origin 
Goal Agent satisfied 
Function Agent status 
Function Agent current Status Comment 
Function Agent futureStatusComment 
4.3 Conclusions & General Principles 
Goal Type  Rating 
both  high 
subsystem  moderate 
state  high 
both  low 
both  low 
subsystem  high 
state  moderate 
both  low 
both  high 
both  high 
both  low 
both  low 
both  high 
both  moderate 
both  moderate 
Before a system display can be developed, the knowledge that it must convey to 
the user must be determined. While the precise content of information to be displayed to 
the pilot largely depends on the display format(s) used, explicit identification and a general 
ranking of relative importance is useful for making the tough design decisions that are 
constantly present in user-interface design. 
Presenting all of the potentially useful information to a system user is typically not 
feasible due to physical, spatial, and cognitive limitations. When designing the 
AgendaManager interfaces, table 4.4 was used to determine what information was 24 
presented to the pilot, and due to the aforementioned constraints, what information was 
left out. The higher the rating given to a particular piece of information (high, moderate, 
or low) the larger the effort to include it in the display design. A detailed description of 
the Agenda manager display designs developed for this study can be found in Chapter 6 of 
this thesis. 25 
5. Cognition, Perception, General Design Constraints and Guidelines 
5.1 Introduction 
The psychology of display use consists of two interdependent components, 
perception and cognition. Since the scope of these subject areas overlap and many 
consider the field of perception merely a segment of cognition (Schiffman, 1990), the 
serial arrangement of concepts is the preference of the author.  Included in the discussion 
on cognitive considerations will be mental model(s), attention, and memory. Perceptual 
considerations will consist of basic perceptual design constraints, display object(s) color, 
color coding, contrast, shapes, spacing and organization, and CRT visual fatigue. In 
conclusion, several display guidelines and constraints for AgendaManager visual displays 
will be discussed and a compiled 'display guide' presented. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis described what AgendaManager information should be 
displayed to the pilot. This chapter uses a literature review to explore some possible 
alternative approaches and guidelines characterizing how the information should be 
displayed. While the knowledge presented in this chapter was acquired with potential 
AgendaManager display formats in mind, it is formatted in such a way to be more 
generally applicable. 
Before perceptual and cognitive theories can be described, a brief discussion 
concerning existing common display formats, and these formats' relationships to aircraft 
automation should be addressed. 
5.2 Common Visual Display Formats and Cockpit Automation 
The three main types of display formats (although variations upon these ideas will 
be considered) of interest for this project are alphanumeric, graphical, and a combination 
of the two. A study conducted by Legge et al. (1989) demonstrated the superior 
performance of a 'scatterplot' display (graphical), over simple alphanumeric and luminance 
coded displays with a simple monitoring task. Furthermore, Gillie and Berry (1994), cite a 
study conducted by Morris et al. (1985) that demonstrated better subject performance 26 
when using a multiple display (e.g. text and graphics), while the subject's performance was 
substandard using the graphical display. These studies seem to demonstrate a preference 
for multiple displays (in the systems which they were employed) which appeared to allow 
the subjects to form better 'mental models'. The latter study is more applicable to this 
project due to the complexity of the system represented. 
In general, according to Bennett and Flach (1992) "There appears to be a clear 
consensus that performance can be improved by providing displays that allow the observer 
to utilize the more efficient processes of perception and pattern recognition instead of ... 
the cognitively intensive processes of memory, integration, and inference." (page 514). 
The increasing role of automation, with tasks previously performed by humans 
being assigned to automated systems, present interesting and unique challenges to the 
modern multi-function display designer. Stokes et al. (1990) presented several basic 
guidelines for automation display designers. Display attributes should be parallel to the 
user's 'mental model' of the system. The data displayed to the user should be brief, 
organized logically, and use symbology that is suitable to the system operator's 
understanding. Finally, any information that could be ofuse to the operator should be 
effortlessly accessible and presented in such a form as to minimize any type of translation. 
5.3 Cognitive Considerations 
5.31 Mental Models 
Mental models, though sometimes ambiguous in their definition, are defined by 
Rouse et. al. (1992) from Rouse and Morris (1986) as "The mechanisms whereby humans 
are able to generate descriptions of system purpose and form, explanations ofsystem 
functioning and observed system states, and predictions of future system states." (p. 351). 
According to Preece (1993), we form mental models of how we interact with the 
surrounding world. In an aircraft cockpit this would include mental models for all aircraft 
subsystems, the physical relationships between the airplane and the environment (i.e., the 
aircraft's dynamic response characteristics), and, in general, the relationship between the 
aircrew's inputs and the associated system outputs. 27 
A major factor in the efficient operation ofa complex system such as a modern 
commercial airliner is the accuracy of the operator's mental models facilitating a reliable 
interpretation of the system's status (Wiener & Nagel, 1988). Four aspects of the 
operator's cognitive models of complex systems warrant special attention. These include 
the effects of mental models on the interpretations of spatial representations, explication of 
pictures and text, overall team (or aircrew) performance, and human-computer interaction. 
The first two considerations are due to the cockpit design layout conventions, the next to 
the fact that a typical commercial plane's aircrew includes at least two people, and the last 
to the considerable integration of computers into the cockpit. 
The way in which an aircrew would integrate with the aircraft system, the 
AgendaManager, and with each other, would be profoundly influenced by the structure 
and compatibility of their corresponding mental models and the accuracy of their mental 
models with respect to the actual system structure. Six characteristics of decision making 
situations where the user's mental models would be a significant factor were noted by 
Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas (1992, p. 1296). They are: 
1) a highly dynamic environment 
2) when system goals change and sometimes conflict 
3) information is deficient, and/or unclear 
4) there is more than one user 
5) operators have varying duties and obligations 
6) decisions are made in a structured fashion 
Attributes within an advanced commercial jet cockpit obviously fulfill these 
characteristics. The aforementioned authors conducted a comprehensive study of aircrew 
interaction and substantiated the study results with similar data obtained from a NASA 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) study. They found that 81% of the "observed 
team deficiencies were associated with inadequate, inappropriate, or lack of expectations 
and explanations." (p. 1307). Although there was no direct association between these 
findings and poor continuity between user mental models, the authors felt that this 
inference was certainly plausible. 28 
A pilot's mental model(s) of the aircraft subsystems form the basis by which he or 
she will evaluate the goal and function information presented by the AgendaManager. In 
addition, his perceived mental model of the AgendaManager's 'mental model' will dictate 
his reactions to the agenda information presented. 
Three viewpoints of a mental model have been defined (Norman,  1988): the 
system designer's model, the user's model, and the system's image. Discrepancies 
between these viewpoints arise from a lack of direct communication between the designer 
and user and a confusing or obscure system image. In essence, the system image is a link 
between the designer's and potential user's mental models of the system (in this case both 
the aircraft and AgendaManager). Therefore, for the designer to facilitate a clear and 
accurate model of the system, careful consideration of the final image of the system must 
be taken. 
When developing the AgendaManager display to present a system image to the 
user(s), attention must be given to the differences and similarities of human processing of 
spatial and verbal information. While the use of a spatial presentation of information is 
advantageous when possible language and interpretation biases are considered, the overall 
complexity of information that can be displayed can be limited (Sanders & McCormick, 
1993). Glenberg and McDaniels (1992) found that humans convey information with the 
same "structure, content, and temporal ordering" (p. 459), regardless of the form of the 
information (pictorial or linguistic). This implies that these types of information are 
decoded by use of a analogous model, and although in different forms, are processed in a 
similar fashion. 
The manner in which spatial and verbal information are displayed to the pilots of 
an advanced commercial transport aircraft seems to largely depend upon the message's 
content. A more complex and detailed message would tend to require a textual display, 
while a fairly simple message would tend to favor a visual format. However, to 
adequately compare the AgendaManager displays developed for this thesis (see chapter 6 
for more detail), the information presented by each display system will need to be as 
equivalent as possible while also taking advantage of inherent display format strengths. A 29 
graphical context may lessen processing time while a purely textual format can provide 
more detail. 
Regardless of the display format (i.e., text, graphic, or both) used, the most 
important constraint to be followed when presenting information to the user is to obey 
Miller's (1956) magic number rule and limit the number of units of information displayed 
to between 5 and 9 (Medin & Ross, 1992). Displaying more information than the pilot 
can process in the already overwhelming cockpit environment would quickly negate any 
benefits acquired through display format selection. 
Mental models have several distinct characteristics (Stagger & Norcio, 1993), 
most notably their construction, structure, type, performance, and number. Since the basis 
of mental model construction is past experience, it is evident that people transform prior 
knowledge into a form applicable to the new system, dependent upon inherent system 
similarities. Pilots routinely fly airplanes with different configurations (Wiener & Nagel, 
1988). Aircraft configurations can vary in terms of levels of automation, subsytem 
organization, and standard operating procedures. Thus, if a pilot's mental model of the 
aircraft system and its interaction with the AgendaManager is based upon one type of 
system, the development of the mental models that describe the new system may be 
negatively influenced by past experience. 
According to Stagger & Norcio (1993), "many authors think mental models are 
organized structures consisting of objects and their relationships" (p. 591). If so, how are 
pilots supposed to form an adequate mental structure of on-board aircraft automatic 
systems whose functions are almost entirely internal, providing little more feedback than 
the current system settings? An appropriately designed AgendaManager display could 
facilitate the formation of the pilot's mental model(s) of the functions and goals of the 
aircraft's automatic systems. 
One of the primary reasons humans construct mental models isto perform 
deduction and reasoning tasks (Payne, 1993). These abilities are very crucial during high 
stress or unpredictable situations similar to those that can be experienced by flightcrews. 
Thus, it is evident that the construction of reliable mental models of modern commercial 
aircraft systems by pilots is crucial for the safe operation of the system. 30 
Clearly, a primary focus of any Agenda Manager display should be inform the 
aircrew of the aircraft automated systems' objectives in a manner that promotes the 
construction of accurate, and henceforth useful, mental models. In addition, the focus of 
these mental models will be agenda management, aiding the pilot in building an accurate 
model of the current agenda. 
5.3.2 Attention 
Probably the most important aspect of a pilot's cognitive ability that a display 
designer should be concerned about is his or her attention. Indeed, how can important 
information be passed to the pilot if he or she is unaware of the display? Sanders and 
McCormick (1993) define four types of attention. They include selective, focused, 
divided, and sustained attention. 
Selective attention is when the observer is watching several different sources of 
data while executing a single task. An operator who must concentrate on only one or a 
few stimuli is employing focused attention, while someone who is performing more than 
one task at a time is using divided attention. Sustained attention concerns the subject's 
vigilance to detecting a stimulus over some elapsed time. 
Since pilots primarily operate in a multi-task environment, and with the expanding 
use of automation increasing the amount of crew monitoring (Stewart, 1992), the 
development of an AgendaManager display should focus on the divided and sustained 
aspects of attention. Sanders and McCormick (1993) have developed some guidelines to 
maximize human performance based upon the single and multiple resource theories of 
divided attention. The relevant guidelines concerning an AgendaManager display are 
paraphrased below: 
1. The number of potential sources of information 
should be kept to a minimum. 
2. When time-sharing may stress the observer's limits 
information that would allow the operator to 
prioritize tasks should be available. 
3. Try to reduce apprehension about where or when 
a signal will occur. 31 
The implications of these recommendations to the development of the 
AgendaManager display are fairly straightforward. The smallest number of displays 
should be employed, some type of prioritization and should be devised, and display 
interaction with the observer should be consistent. 
While the AgendaManager display will be primarily visual,  user attention could be 
more readily invoked in the visually cluttered environment of an aircraft cockpit by an 
auditory display. Wiener (1988) believes that using auditory channels to present 
information to the pilot would help alleviate an overloaded visual channel. Since auditory 
signals alert the system operator regardless of his or her current head position or eye 
alignment, they are ideal for alarms or other urgent 'attention' messages. However, since 
auditory alarms are already prominent in the modern jet cockpit, the use of this type of 
attention invoking method by the AgendaManager display should be carefully 
implemented so that any confusion with already present alarms is avoided. 
Stokes et al. (1990) mention an 'attention tunneling phenomenon', or tunnel 
vision, that is experienced by pilots during high levels of stress in the cockpit. This effect 
seems to be caused by a filtering mechanism in the brain that becomes more selective 
concerning what, and how much, data can be absorbed by the observer at any one time. 
Since the AgendaManager system is designed to be of the most help during high stress, 
danger, and high workload situations, any display designed for it should consider the 
possible effects of the aforementioned phenomenon. 
5.3.3 Memory 
Human memory is another key factor influencing display design since the observer 
must call on these memory stores to accumulate required information. Memory is 
typically described as a set of sensory, short, long, and working memory stores (Medin 
and Ross, 1992). For this study working and short-term memory can be considered the 
same for all practical purposes. 
The sensory store is a compilation of sensory information in which any information 
contained within is lost within a matter of seconds. Short-term memory has a storage 
capacity of about seven units of information plus or minus two (Sanders and McCormick, 32 
1993). This information can be maintained in the working memory store for longer 
periods of time if it is rehearsed, but that is obviously an impractical task to assign any 
pilot, especially during high workload situations. 
Due to the storage limitations of short-term memory, any AgendaManager display 
should limit the amount of information presented to the user at any moment. However, 
due to the complexities of modern commercial jet aircraft and the requirement that the 
organization of the information presented be consistent with the aircrew's mental models 
of the system, adherence to data quantity constraint may not be feasible. 
When subjects are presented data in a serial fashion, they tend to recall the first and 
latter portions of the data to a greater degree. These effects, termed primacy and recency 
effects, occur across modalities (Greene, 1992). In addition, when an auditory stimulus is 
used, the recency effect seems to be magnified (increased recall) when an auditory cue, 
such as simply saying the word 'end', was employed to inform the subject of the 
conclusion of the list (Greene, 1992). 
Wickens (1992) believes that the careful application of automation and advanced 
displays in the cockpit could lead to a reduction in the working memory and manual skills 
load of the aircrew. He mentions computer generated checklists, voice recognition 
systems, and 'scratch pads' among display developments. Careful implementation of the 
right kinds of automation (like the AgendaManager), in the right quantities, and in the 
right place could significantly aid in the management of the pilot's limited working 
memory. 
Long-term memory appears to have an extremely large capacity, last a lifetime, 
and be encoded at different levels (Medin and Ross, 1992). Since long-term memory 
storage seems to be permanent, any loss of long-term memory is more likely due to some 
type of retrieval failure. 
Recognition performance has been shown to be a function of encoding. In an 
experiment cited by Green (1992), Craik and Tulving (1975) found that respondents 
recalled words better when they were in the context of a sentence than when they were 
associated with a rhyme or the case of a word. Thus, displaying textual or auditory 33 
information in a sentence or another like context, may increase the proportion of a 
message that is recalled by the pilot. 
5.4 Perceptual Considerations 
5.4.1 Basic Perceptual Design Constraints 
The Agenda Manager display(s) would be implemented in the environment of a 
modern commercial jet transport. This adds design constraints involving not only the 
'physical' cockpit, but also the human operators. The most obvious limitation is that any 
new cockpit display will be deployed on a non-mechanical device like a cathode ray tube 
or liquid crystal display due to cost, compatibility with other aircraft displays, and spacing 
concerns. This constraint will ensure that a two dimensional display is employed due to 
the flat panel, but an effort may be made to use limited monocular illusions if they are 
deemed useful. 
While positive polarity (black text on white background) screens are generally 
favored (Travis, 1990), due to the desire to maintain the aircrew's dark adaptation during 
evening flights and the use of CRTs in the cockpit, the display must have a negative 
polarity (black background). In addition, since commercial pilots are carefully screened 
for both good acuity and color vision (O'Hare, 1990), there is no need to design for any 
type of color blindness or poor contrast sensitivity. 
5.4.2 Hue, Saturation, Luminance, and Color Coding 
"Color has been shown to be the most efficient dimension for the labeling of 
information in visual displays." (Smallman and Boynton, 1990, p. 1985). While color is 
used effectively in even the most primitive displays, it has even more potential in a multi­
function display needing to present a significantly larger amount of information. Cooper 
(1990), showed that color cues were more effective than size and location cues in 
attracting the attention of subjects in respect to lower reaction times. 34 
As mentioned previously, the background color of the display is already 
constrained to be black. Therefore, the only color combination schemes that need to be 
studied involve the individual 'objects' or 'symbols' in the display. However, while much of 
the previous data collected on the subject of hue, saturation, and luminance regarding  our 
perception of color is not necessarily valid on a CRT display due to photometric 
differences (Stokes et al., 1990), recent findings lay the foundations for some useful basic 
principles. 
The use of color combinations for information coding are best guided by the 
physiological principles inherent in the visual system. This implies the avoidance of colors 
that do not trigger the red/green opponent structure in the neural system (Stokes et al., 
1990), including "blue and yellow, blue and white, blue and green, and yellow and white" 
(page 80). In general, colors whose electrospectrum wavelengths are close to each other 
should not be combined. 
Previous color coding recommendations advised that no more than five colors be 
used, but research conducted by Smallman and Boynton (1990) demonstrated that it was 
possible to double this figure using 'focal basic colors' like red, pink, purple, blue, green, 
yellow, orange, and brown. Furthermore, when comparing these colors they found that 
green proved particularly poor in search time experiments. 
5.4.3 Contrast, Visual Angle, and Shapes 
Sanders and McCormick (1993) list five basic principles of the design of symbols 
or shapes. They include: figure to ground, figure boundaries, closure, simplicity, and 
unity. Table 5.1 lists the definitions for these principles. 35 
Table 5.1 Principles of symbol and shape design 
Figure to Ground - A distinct figure to ground, or object to background relationship. 
Figure Boundaries - Use contrast for a boundary instead of lines. 
Closure - Use closed figures. 
Simplicity - The shapes and symbols used should be simple. 
Unity - Symbols need to be unified (i.e. details inside figure not outside). 
In addition to these findings, Kaufman and Eaton (1994) demonstrated the 
superiority of simplified symbols when a multi-colored CRT display is used. 
Much of the aforementioned display design principles assumed that the object was 
in the foveal field, but it must be noted that visual processing is also happening outside in 
the periphery of the field of vision (Scott and Findlay, 1991). Since if used, a single screen 
AgendaManager display incorporated into the secondary flight displays would  not usually 
be in the primary field of vision for the pilot, it is important that emergent features 
(features of the symbol which can change to distinguish distinct system states) be used 
whenever possible if the display is graphic in nature. These features aid the display 
viewer, usually the system operator, in the identification of changes (usually hazardous) in 
a dynamic and complex system (Buttigieg and Sanderson, 1991). 
Due to screening of the visual acuity of pilots, it can be assumed that they will 
possess 20/20 vision and thereby the minimum perceivable visual angle of any symbol will 
be constant. According to Proctor and Zandt (1994) the minimum acceptable visual angle 
is around 1 degree. The visual angle of an object is the inverse tangent of the stimulus size 
compared the distance of the viewed object from the eyeball. Assuming the pilots will be 
around 3 feet from the display and using the tangent of 1 degree as a multiplier, any 
symbol on an AgendaManager display should measure no smaller than 0.5 inch in size. 
Like color, contrast can be effective when used to distinguish between differing 
states of the system (Sanders and McCormick, 1993). Travis(1990) cites three current 
definitions of contrast, the Michelson contrast, contrast ratio, and contrast. Defining Lh 
as the higher luminance and Ls as the smaller luminance the three definitions are (Lh ­36 
Ls) /(Lh + Ls), Lh /Ls, and (Lh-Ls) / Ls, respectfully. While caution must be used when 
employing contrast as a state indicator, Sanders and McCormick (1993) declare that it is 
adequate to distinguish between two different levels. 
5.4.4 Spacing and Organization 
Designing a display to take advantage of emergent features not only involves the 
shape of the individual symbols but their grouping. Buttigieg and Sanderson (1991) 
improved subjects' failure detection performance by displaying two inputs and their 
corresponding output as an 'emergent' bar graph. This was simply taking advantage of the 
fact that "the graphical elements of a display will interact to produce emergent features." 
(Bennett and Flach, 1992, page 517). Once again, it appears that by utilizing the 'natural' 
perceptual skills of a systems operators, the performance of the operators can be 
improved. 
The aspect ratio of a display (the ratio of width to height of a display or group of 
displays) plays a significant role in the perceptual grouping of the display objects by 
experimental subjects (Armstrong and Hoffman, 1990). As the aspect ratio of the display 
elements was increased, the perception that the elements were grouped vertically 
decreased. This effect was so prominent that elements with an aspect ratio greater than 
1.5 are virtually never grouped regardless of other shape detail and characteristics. 
Conversely, they found that as the 'external' aspect ratio (i.e. the border) increased the 
perception that the display objects were grouped also increased. 
As previously demonstrated, the perceptual organization of a stimulus is an 
important factor in the way a system user may perceive a display. Proctor and Zandt 
(1994) listed four major Gestalt organizational precepts: proximity, similarity, continuity, 
and closure. Humans will perceive objects as being grouped if they are near each other, 
similar, and form a continuous or a closed structure. These concepts should be carefully 
investigated if any type of display object grouping is desired. 37 
5.4.5 CRT Displays and Visual Fatigue 
Recent experiments comparing subjects' reading of text from cathode ray tube 
display screens has shown a "type of spatial frequency selective adaptation ... to high 
contrast gratings" (page 340, Travis, 1990). This effect was especially strong in readers of 
positive contrast displays, to which this display design is constrained. The effect may 
account for the visual fatigue experienced by people who use CRTs often. While no 
studies of this effect have occurred in aircraft cockpits, it may be prudent to examine 
carefully any perceived need to use a particularly large amount of text of this nature 
considering the large amount of continuous hours flown by airline pilots. 
5.5 Visual Display Guide 
Table 5.2 contains a compilation of the aforementioned and additional information 
in a form that was used to guide the development of the AgendaManager visual displays. 
It is hoped that this format can better facilitate the formation, generation, and integration 
of the AgendaManager displays with and within the modern automated jet cockpit existing 
displays and interfaces. While the following information was compiled with potential 
AgendaManager displays in mind, many portions of it are applicable to any display design. 
Table 5.2 AgendaManager display design guide 
Guideline  Reference 
1. Basic Design Constraints 
a. The maximum display size is 7.25" wide and 3.75" high
 
(roughly the same size as an average secondary flight display
 
[SFD]).
 
b. Background color must be black to conform to current
 
cockpit display types and to help maintain dark adaptation at
 
night.
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Guideline 
2. Cognitive Considerations 
a. Mental Model(s) Development & Usability 
1. Allow for user error & reversibility. 
2. Use constraints (see above for some cases though) to 
keep user from employing obviously wrong or contradictory 
modes &/or system states [ allow for over-ride in case of 
system malfunction ]. 
3. Use 'natural mapping' to improve user mental-model
 
compatibility with the system.
 
4. Use both external & internal knowledge. 
5. Simplify tasks and their structure(s) as much as possible. 
6. Display only useful/proper information. 
b. Attention 
1. Use the fewest number of displays feasible, and the fewest 
number of display 'parts'. 
2. Use a prioritization scheme. 
3. Use consistent display interaction with observer. 
4. If possible, concurrent tasks should use separate 
modalities. 
5. If the required task is detection, the object should be 
different from its detractors in at least one primitive feature 
(color, shape, size). 
6. Be aware of the 'attention tunneling phenomenon'. This 
is experienced by pilots during high stress situations where 
the brain seems to use a more selective mechanism for visual 
observation. 
7. Use an additive approach for system state alerts since 
subjects are better at finding an symbol that 'exists'  or is 
added, than noticing one that does not or is taken away from 
a group. 
Reference 
(Norman, 1988) 
(Norman, 1988) 
(Norman, 1988) 
(Norman, 1988) 
(Norman, 1988) 
(Norman, 1988) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pgs. 70-76, 1993) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pgs. 70-76, 1993) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pgs. 70-76, 1993) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pgs. 70-76, 1993) 
(Medin & Ross, 1990) 
(Stokes et. al., 1990) 
(Medin & Ross, 1990) 39 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Guideline 
c. memory 
1. Limit information presented at any one time since short-
term or working memory has a capacity of only about seven 
`chunks' of information. 
2. Reduce response time by decreasing the information 
stored in working-memory (to about 5 `chunks'), due to the 
increase in recall time with larger sets of data. 
3. When information is given in serial fashion, the most
 
critical information should be given first or last since
 
subjects recall those portions of a series better.
 
4. Information should be arranged in a meaningful manner 
since it is far easier to remember. 
5. Use a spatial working memory code when the display
 
modality is visual in nature.
 
6. Any code used "should be meaningfully related to its
 
referent."
 
7. Any code 'strings' should use less than 6 characters. 
3. Perceptual Considerations 
a. Hue, Saturation, Luminance, and Color Coding 
1. Use color to code information. 
2. Avoid color combinations that do not trigger red/green 
opponent structure [i.e. blue/yellow; blue/white; blue/green; 
& yellow/white], in addition, color combinations whose 
wavelengths are close should be avoided. 
3. Watch for negative 'afterimages' with peripheral 
displays. 
4. Use the colors red for 'danger', amber for 'caution' and 
white for 'advisory' since these color associations are well 
entrenched in users' psyche and should not be violated. 
Reference 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pg. 67, 1993) 
(Johnson, pg. 22, 1992) 
(Green, 1992) 
(Johnson, 1992, pg. 20) 
(Wickens, pgs. 217-218, 
1992) 
(Wickens, 1992, p. 
179) 
(Wickens, pg. 179, 
1992) 
(Smallman & Boynton, 
1990; Cooper, 1990) 
(Stokes et al., 1990) 
(Stokes et al., 1990) 40 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Guideline 
a. Hue, Saturation, Luminance, and Color Coding
 
(Continued)
 
5. Among basic colors, green demonstrated the slowest
 
response time.
 
b. Contrast, Visual Angle, and Shapes 
1. Shapes and symbols should be simple. 
2. Use closed figures. 
3. Figure/ground relationships should be clear. 
4. Use contrast for figure boundaries instead of lines. 
5. Unify symbols. (i.e. details inside of figure, not outside) 
6. When displays will likely not usually be in the foveal 
field, emergent features should be used. (symbol features 
that change to indicate system state changes) 
7. The minimum acceptable visual angle is around 1 degree. 
Assuming a distance from display around 3 ft, the symbol 
must at least 0.5 in wide. 
8. Contrast variation can be used to indicate two different 
state levels. 
c. Spacing and Organization 
1. Usually it is better to emphasize breadth over depth when 
designing menus for the display interface. 
2. More frequently used options should be placed at the top 
of the menus, if they are to be used in the display to reduce 
reaction time. 
Reference 
(Smallman & Boynton, 
1990) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pg. 123, 1993; 
Kaufmann ..'94) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pg. 123, 1993) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pg. 123, 1993) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
1993, p. 123) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pg. 123, 1993) 
(Scott & Findlay, 1991; 
Buttigieg et. al. 1991) 
(Proctor and Zandt, 
1994) 
(Sanders & McCormick, 
pg. 126, 1993) 
(Norman, pg. 213, 
1991) 
(Norman, pg. 244, 
1991) 41 
Table 5.2 (Continued) 
Guideline 
c. Spacing and Organization (Continued) 
3. Information displayed should be coherent, showing clear 
separations and a logical break-down of information. 
4. If possible, use emergent features in symbol organization. 
5. Order display objects keeping in mind that as the aspect 
ratio (width/height) of symbols is increased their perceived 
vertical grouping decreases. 
d Depth Cues 
1.Be extremely cautious of using depth cues (i.e. linear 
perspective). 
e. CRT Displays and Visual Fatigue 
1. Watch for visual fatigue, since readers of text on positive 
contrast CRT's (black background) can experience a "type 
of spatial frequency selective adaptation". 
Reference 
(Johnson, pg. 33, 1992) 
(Buttigieg and 
Sanderson, 1991; 
Bennet ..1992) 
(Armstrong and 
Hoffman, 1990) 
(Stokes et. al., 1990) 
(p. 340) (Travis, 1990) 42 
6. Agenda Manager Interface Design & Development 
6.1 Introduction 
There are many ways in which to display information to users of complex systems 
like commercial jet aircraft. During the development of the AgendaManager interface 
display formats for this study, several types of displays were conceived and some 
implemented. A continual evolutionary design process eventually led to the development 
of the alternative AgendaManager interface, and the completion of a 'baseline' design 
similar to that employed by Kim (1994). 
Chapter 4 of this thesis concentrated on 'what' needed to be presented and chapter 
5 described the basic cognitive and perceptual principles that aid in the design of a 
primarily visual interface. This chapter briefly describes the avionics display formats that 
constrained the design of the interfaces, namely, EICAS (Engine Indicating and Crew 
Alerting System) and Kim's (1994) display coding schematics from which the baseline 
AgendaManager interface was developed. In conclusion, both the baseline and alternative 
AgendaManager interfaces are described. 
6.2 EICAS 
If a system such as the AgendaManager and its interface were ever implemented 
on a real commercial aircraft, care must be given to ensure that the design conforms to 
current and perceived future restraints. The functionality of an AgendaManager system 
includes much of the domain of EICAS. Therefore, any information coding used by the 
AgendaManager should conform to the current EICAS coding philosophies and style, 
where possible. 
The development of the EICAS system began in the late sixties to give the 
flightcrew a way to monitor increasingly complex engine and aircraft subsystems (Morton, 
1983).  Classification of subsystem alerts on the EICAS system is fairly straightforward 
and  is presented in table 6.1. It should be noted that these schemes apply only to the 
segments included in the EICAS warning system that involve a digital textual display. 43 
Several other non-digital text display alerting methods are used by EICAS (most notably 
indicator lights and aural tones) but are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Table 6.1 EICAS color classification schemes 
Message Level  Definition  Color Coding 
Warning  prompt action required  red 
Caution  timely action required  amber 
Advisory  correct when time available  amber 
The digital textual EICAS subsystem display contains subsystem warnings, 
cautions, and advisories. Warnings are displayed in red text, cautions in amber, and 
advisories in amber but with an indent (757 Operations Manual, Boeing).  In the 
subsystem textual display any system parameter that is 'normal' is not displayed. 
Messages displayed by EICAS also encode priority by order. Warnings will be at 
the top of the list followed by cautions and then advisories. In each priority sub-group 
EICAS places the most recent message at the top of the respective list. Pilots have the 
ability to cancel EICAS caution and advisory messages but cannot remove a warning. 
They also have the ability to 'recall' to the list any message that they previously canceled. 44 
6.3 Kim's CTMS Display 
4#0
 
Figure 6.1 Kim's CTMS display 
Kim's display presented the name, status, priority, and state of each task to the 
subject. While this information appears equivalent to that presented by the 
AgendaManager, several key distinctions exist. 
The state transition of a task in Kim's CTMS includes more steps than the logic 
employed by the AgendaManager. In the CTMS a task transitions from latent to 
upcoming, upcoming to in-progress, in-progress to suggested (and back again), and finally 
to finished. A task could transition back and forth between suggested and in-progress 
several times. 
An AgendaManager goal simply transitions from pending to active and then to 
terminated. Although the 'latent' task state does not exist in the AgendaManager 
architecture, and thus cannot be displayed,  a logical association may be expressed as 
follows: upcoming CTMS tasks are equivalent to pending AM goals, in-progress CTMS 
tasks are equivalent to AM active goals, suggested CTMS tasks are equivalent to 
unsatisfactory AM goals, and CTMS finished tasks (which along with latentgoals were 
not presented in Kim's display) are equivalent to AM terminated goals. 45 
As noted on table 4.3, the Agenda Manager assigns one of three possible status 
values to a goal. These include satisfactory, marginal, and unsatisfactory. Kim's CTMS 
only declared a task as satisfactory or unsatisfactory since the CTMS did not posses the 
logic mechanisms required to evaluate trend data. The priority coding schemes used by 
Kim were quite similar to EICAS, and since the system user need only know that the 
highest priority tasks should be completed first, the difference between the AM and CTMS 
coding schemes is trivial. 
Table 6.2 Coding mechanisms used by Kim (1994) 
Information  Coding Scheme 
name  text 
status  color & location 
priority  order & color 
state  location 46 
6.4 Agenda Manager Interface - Baseline 
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Figure 6.2 The AgendaManager interface (AMI) - baseline 
The baseline AgendaManager display was modeled after Kim's (1994) display. 
Table 4.4 summarizes the information to be displayed to the pilot. How that information 
was displayed is described in the following paragraphs. 
Goal conflicts are presented at the top of the display since a goal conflict left 
unresolved could be a very hazardous situation.  Since the current flight simulator was 
designed for a single pilot, goal conflicts can only exist between the pilot and autopilot. 
The flightcrew goal is presented to the left since it is regarded as the most important, 
while the conflicting autopilot goal is presented to the right. The descriptive name of each 
goal is presented, and the autopilot goal also often includes the associated autopilot mode 
name. It should be noted that on a real flightdeck goal conflicts involving a co-pilot could 
also exist. In that setting this aforementioned format might not be valid. 
The color in which the goal conflict is displayed depends upon the amount of time 
it existed since technically a goal conflict is created when any new air traffic control 47 
(ATC) clearance is given (if the autopilot was set to comply with the previous clearance). 
Any goal conflict that was less than 10 seconds old is not presented to the pilot, but after 
10 seconds it was colored white (advisory). After 15 seconds yellow was used (caution) 
and any goal conflict that existed longer than 20 seconds was presented red (warning). 
`Unsatisfactory' and 'other active goals' are presented below the goal conflicts. 
Each goal's name, source, and function agent's current and future status comments are 
presented to provide the pilot with enough information to understand the goal and 
computer projected trends. Relative goal importance (priority) is coded by top-down 
order. The highest priority goals are presented at the top of the list and lower priority 
tasks below them. The active goals list does not include the autopilot's active goals since 
they are redundant (if the goal was different then the pilot's it would be presented as a 
goal conflict), to reduce clutter. 
Color and location are used to present the status of each goal's function agent. It 
should be noted that the pilot does not need to know the distinction between a goal and 
function agent, but simply estimate the relative importance ofeach goal from its color and 
location. Red is used to describe a warning situation, yellow (since it was the closest 
color to amber available) was used to denote caution, and green was used to represent 
goal satisfaction. 
All unsatisfactory goals are presented in the 'unsatisfactory' window pane, while 
both marginal and satisfactory goals are in the 'other active goals' list. Subsystem goals 
are color coded primarily according to priority (like EICAS and CTMS) rather than status. 
The names of the AgendaManager subsystem goals are roughly equivalent to their 
corresponding EICAS messages. The following table lists the coding schemes used by the 
baseline AgendaManager interface and their correlation to the schemes used by the 
CTMS. 48 
Table 6.3 Coding mechanisms used by the baseline AMI & CTMS 
Information  AMI Coding Scheme  CTMS Coding Scheme 
name  text  text 
status  color & location  color & location 
priority  order & color  order & color 
source  text  Not Applicable 
state  location  location 
comments  text  Not Applicable 
goal type  letter casing, coding  Not Applicable 
From the information on table 6.3, the current agenda displayed on figure 6.2 can 
be described. First, there is an altitude goal conflict between the pilot and autopilot. The 
pilot's goal is 'descend to 9000', while the autopilot is currently set to 'descend to 8000'. 
As noted previously, coloring is used to indicate the status of the goal conflict. While all 
of the text in figure 6.3 was colored white to better transpose onto paper, the display 
presented to the pilot the text would be either black, white, yellow, or red. 
The 'descend to 9000' pilot goal is also presented on the 'other active goals' pane 
since by the logic employed by the altitude goal agent, the 'descend to 9000' goal is in a 
satisfactory state (the aircraft is in a satisfactory descent). Green is the color of this text 
message since its current and future status are satisfactory. 
Although the autopilot has been incorrectly set to descend the aircraft to 8000 feet, 
until the aircraft passes below 9000 feet the 'descend to 9000' goal agent may (and in this 
case has) perceive a normal descent. This anomaly, in addition to the higher priority given 
to goal conflicts, is another important justification for a separate 'goal conflicts' pane at 
the top of the display. The source of this goal is indicated by the text message 'pilot', and 
the current and future status comments indicate that the altitude is currently high, but that 
the plane is descending. 49 
Also listed in the 'other active goals' pane is a 'correct FUEL BALANCE' goal. 
The pilot has not yet completed all of the tasks necessary to correct the fuel balance (since 
the text message is there), but has set the fuel system (see table 7.6 for better description 
of fuel balancing procedure) in such a manner that the 'correct FUEL BALANCE' goal 
agent perceives a future satisfactory state. This goal's text message is placed below the 
descent goal since it is gaged as lower in priority. Its color would be either yellow or 
green, depending upon the current and future status of the goal. 
In the 'unsatisfactory goals' pane are the 'correct L ENGINE FIRE' and  'restore 
R FUEL PRESS' goals. The 'correct L ENGINE FIRE' goal's text is placed above the 
`restore R FUEL PRESS' text since it is a higher priority goal. In addition, the engine fire 
goal' text is red and the fuel pressure goal is yellow, giving an additional indicator to their 
status and priority. The sources of the goals are also displayed in the following text. 
While the goal's name often gives a good indication towards its source, there is some 
similarity between subsystem goal names (see chapter 7) and a goal's source was rated 
high priority information (see chapter 4). 
Some baseline AgendaManagerInterface coding schemes violate guidelines 
mentioned in chapter 5 of this work since goals (subsystem and control) are coded 
differently in the same window panes [guideline 2b-3]. For example, while a caution or 
advisory level subsystem goal's function agent's status might be unsatisfactory, it would 
never be color coded red since a requirement of the baseline displaywas that it conform 
with EICAS. In addition, while the color green has demonstrated the slowest subject 
response time in experiments [guideline 3a-5], it was deemed the most appropriate color 
to emphasize goal satisfaction. White was the alternate choice, but since that color is used 
to denote an advisory condition [guideline 3a-4] it was unacceptable. 
However, many of the design guidelines listed in table 5.2 were successfully 
applied to this display. The text display uses the fewest number of displays feasible (one) 
[guideline 2b-1]. It employs a prioritization scheme [guideline 2b-2], uses color to code 
information [guideline 3a-1], utilizes red for 'danger' and amber (yellow) for 'caution' 
while avoiding poor color combinations [guideline 3a-4], and presents a coherent 
distribution of information [guideline 3c-3]. 50 
6.5 Agenda Manager Interface - Alternate 
Through the application of perceptual and cognitive principles described in 
Chapter 5, an alternate AgendaManager interface was developed to increase agenda 
management performance. However, before these can be presented, the perceived 
drawbacks and flaws of the baseline AgendaManager display should be discussed. 
Perceived Drawbacks in Baseline Display 
Several potential problems with the baseline display were recognized during 
interface development. Some of these aspects were briefly described in earlier chapters 
and are now described here in more detail. 
Kim (1994) did not make the distinction between an aircraft control goal and a 
subsystem goal. As previously mentioned, aircraft control goals (altitude, speed, heading) 
are always present during the flight, while a subsystem goal is in response to an event, 
such as a failure, in an aircraft subsystem. 
The CTMS display also used only alpha-numeric text. Many researchers (see 
chapter 5 section 2) have noted that humans tend to perform better (e.g. quicker reaction 
times) with well designed graphic images than with alphanumeric text. Therefore, a 
display incorporating some graphics while keeping the object's emergent features in mind 
(see chapter 5), could improve subject performance. 
In the layout of a modern commercial jet cockpit a CTMS type display would be 
confined to the secondary flight display page. In the Boeing 777, the EICAS display 
(where an AgendaManager text type baseline page would probably be) is approximately 
39 degrees horizontal from the pilot's primary line ofsight (R. J. Braune, personal 
communication). This layout is clearly out of the pilot's primary field of vision. In 
addition, the tunneling phenomenon described by Stokes et. al. (1990), ensures an 
AgendaManager CTMS like display to be outside of the pilot's primary field of vision 
during high stress, critical, phases of flight when the pilot's attention is concentrated on an 
indicator on the PFD (e.g. attitude)  . 51 
Lastly, in a modern day commercial jet cockpit either the pilot or co-pilot could be 
piloting the aircraft. Therefore, an Agenda Manager display located on the PFD could be 
`user centered', and thereby present agenda management information with the context of 
the viewing party in mind. The pilot could be presented information from his perspective 
and the co-pilot could be presented information from his perspective.  While not applicable 
to this experiment, in an actual cockpit this aspect could prove important. 
The alternative Agenda Manager interface consists of the baseline interface (figure 
6.2) plus the additional elements pictured in figures 6.3 and 6.4 on the following page. 
Three arrows that correspond to the pilot's speed, altitude, and heading goals are placed 
on the primary flight display when the associated goal is yet to be satisfied. They are color 
coded according to the goal's status in the same manner as the baseline display since the 
baseline (text) display is also available to the pilot (although on the secondary flight 
display). 
Arrows provide a graphic representation of the direction that the speed, altitude, 
or heading should be moving towards. The target value of the parameter (speed, heading, 
altitude) in front of the arrow. As previously mentioned, if the goal is satisfied the arrow 
will disappear leaving only the number. Color (coded to correspond with the baseline 
display) indicates the status of the goal. 
The arrows follow the principle given by guideline 3b-1  since their shape is very 
simple. They also use contrast for figure boundaries [guideline 3b-4] with a black 
background provide a clear figure/ground relationship [guideline 3b-3], are closed 
[guideline 3b-2], and employ object emergent features to code information [guideline 3b­
6]. More detailed descriptions of these principles can be found in chapter 5 (see table 5.2 
for a quick reference). 
Three smaller double ended arrows are used to indicate the presence of a goal 
conflict. They pointed to the pilot's goals (speed, altitude, or heading) and associated 
autopilot settings also displayed on the PFD (speed and altitude setting presented in small 
boxes above the speed and altitude strips) and current the heading on the HSI  As with . 
the aircraft control goal arrows they were color coded in association with the baseline 
display. 52 
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Figure 6.3 The AgendaManager interface - alternate 
Figure 6.4 Caution/warning indicator and graphic subsystem fault warning 
Since anything that could clutter the PFD could be a distraction, the display of 
these arrows was limited to the caution (yellow) and warning (red) stages of a goal 
conflict. An aural warning for goal conflicts was considered but rejected since the type 
and level of noise on an actual commercial jet cockpit could not be duplicated during the 
experimental run. 53 
From figure 6.3 the pilots speed, heading, and altitude goals are clearly identified 
by the arrows and numerical text placed in front of them.  The current agenda is to 
increase the airspeed to 240 knots, turn right to heading 330, and climb to 9000 feet. 
Double sided arrows placed adjacent to current autopilot settings (heading would be on 
the HSI page directly below the heading arrow - see appendix figure A.1) indicate goal 
speed, heading, and altitude goal conflicts. Coloring of the arrows (not clear in the B&W 
picture) would depend upon the aforementioned status of the goals. 
The caution/warning indicator shown in figure 6.4 informs the pilot of any 
unsatisfactory goals and their priority. This is equivalent to current EICAS cockpit 
caution/warning indicator lights, but uses the AgendaManager goal hierarchy for its 
model. This indicator was not considered part of either display since it models an existing 
system and thereby was present during every experimental run. 
Subsystem faults are represented by icons with the highest priority subsystem 
goal's icon informing the pilot which subsystem should be attended to first. A 'plus' icon 
is presented below the subsystem goal's icon if any additional (but lower or equal in 
priority) subsystem goals exist. 
Lines around the highest priority icon were used to distinguish it from the 'plus' 
icon. While this went against guideline 3b-4 (use contrast instead of lines to distinguish 
boundaries) it was deemed necessary since the subsystem display boundary was not the 
same color on each side. 
The subsystem fault icons were color coded in accordance to their priorities in the 
same manner as the text in the baseline display. As can be seen on figure 6.4, a fuel 
system fault is currently the highest priority subsystem fault in the agenda, and the plus 
sign indicates at least one addition subsystem fault. 
Table 6.4 is a summary of the application of principles from the display design 
guide (table 5.2) to both the baseline and alternate AgendaManager interfaces. A `+' sign 
means that the principle was applied in the design and a `-' indicates that, due to another 
constraint, the principle was violated. Ifno mark is present the constraint was not deemed 
directly applicable to the display. 54 
Table 6.4 AgendaManager display design guide - checklist 
Design Guideline 
1. Basic Design Constraints 
a. The maximum display size is 7.25" wide and 3.75" high (roughly 
the same size as an average secondary flight display [SFD]). 
b. Background color must be black to conform to current cockpit 
display types and to help maintain dark adaptation at night. 
2. Cognitive Considerations 
a. Mental Model(s) Development & Usability 
1. Allow for user error & reversibility. (Norman, 1988) 
2. Use constraints (see above for some cases though) to keep user 
from employing obviously wrong or contradictory modes & /or 
system states [ allow for over-ride in case of system malfunction ].
 
(Norman, 1988)
 
3. Use 'natural mapping' to improve user mental-model
 
compatibility with the system. (Norman, 1988)
 
4. Use both external & internal knowledge. (Norman,  1988) 
5. Simplify tasks and their structure(s) as much as possible. 
(Norman, 1988) 
6. Display only useful/proper information. (Norman,  1988) 
b. Attention 
1. Use the fewest number of displays feasible, and the fewest 
number of display 'parts'. (Sanders & McCormick, pgs. 70-76, 
1993) 
2. Use a prioritization scheme.(Sanders & McCormick, pgs. 70-76, 
1993) 
3. Use consistent display interaction with observer (Sanders & 
McCormick, pgs. 70-76, 1993) 
baseline alternate 
+ 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ + 
+ 
+ +
 
+ +
 
The alternate AgendaManger display uses several display 'pieces' located near relevant 
items to better adhere to the users mental model of the system and PFD organization. 55 
Table 6.4 (Continued) 
Design Guideline 
2-b. Attention (Continua° 
4. If possible, concurrent tasks should use separate modalities. 
(Sanders & McCormick, pgs. 70-76, 1993) 
5. If the required task is detection, the object should be different 
from its detractors in at least one primitive feature (color, shape, 
size) (Medin & Ross, 1990) 
6. Be aware of the 'attention tunneling phenomenon'. This is 
experienced by pilots during high stress situations where the brain 
seems to use a more selective mechanism for visual observation 
(Stokes et. al., 1990) 
7. Use an additive approach for system state alerts since subjects 
are better at finding an symbol that 'exists' or is added, than 
noticing one that does not or is taken away from a group. (Medin & 
Ross, 1990) 
c. memory 
1. Limit information presented at any one time since short-term or 
working memory has a capacity of only about seven 'chunks' of 
information. (Sanders & McCormick, pg. 67, 1993) 
2. Reduce response time by decreasing the information stored in 
working-memory (to about 5 `chunks'), due to the increase in recall 
time with larger sets of data. (Johnson, pg. 22, 1992) 
3. When information is given in serial fashion, the most critical 
information should be given first or last since subjects recall those 
portions of a series better. (Green, 1992) 
4. Information should be arranged in a meaningful manner since it 
is far easier to remember. (Johnson, 1992, pg. 20) 
5. Use a spatial working memory code when the display modality is 
visual in nature. (Wickens, pgs. 217-218, 1992) 
6. Any code used "should be meaningfully related to its referent." 
(Wickens, 1992, p. 179) 
All information is displayed visually. 
al Same as above. 
baseline alternate 
ii  fii - -
+ + 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ +
 
+ +
 
+
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Table 6.4 (Continued) 
Design Guideline 
2-c. memory (Continued) 
7. Any code 'strings' should use less than 6 characters. (Wickens,
 
pg. 179, 1992)
 
3. Perceptual Considerations 
a. Hue, Saturation, Luminance, and Color Coding 
1. Use color to code information. (Smallman & Boynton, 1990; 
Cooper, 1990) 
2. Avoid color combinations that do not trigger red/green opponent 
structure [i.e. blue/yellow; blue/white; blue/green; & yellow/white], 
in addition, color combinations whose wavelengths are close should 
be avoided. (Stokes et al., 1990) 
3. Watch for negative 'afterimages' with peripheral displays. 
4. Use the colors red for 'danger', amber for 'caution' and white 
for 'advisory' since these color associations are well entrenched in 
users' psyche and should not be violated. (Stokes et al., 1990) 
5. Among basic colors, green demonstrated the slowest response 
time. (Smallman & Boynton, 1990) 
b. Contrast, Visual Angle, and Shapes 
1. Shapes and symbols should be simple. (Sanders & McCormick, 
pg. 123, 1993; Kaufmann ..'94) 
2. Use closed figures. (Sanders & McCormick, pg. 123, 1993) 
3. Figure/ground relationships should be clear. (Sanders & 
McCormick, pg. 123, 1993) 
baseline alternate 
+  + 
+  + 
+  + 
_iv  -
v 
+ 
+ 
+ 
ry 
Green was used to indicate a fully satisfactory condition since white is sometimes used by 
newer versions of EICAS to relay certain types of fault messages (Rolf Braune, Personal 
Communication). 
" Same as above. 57 
Table 6.4 (Continued) 
Design Guideline 
3-b. Contrast, Visual Angle, and Shapes (Continued) 
4. Use contrast for figure boundaries instead of lines. (Sanders &
 
McCormick, 1993, p. 123)
 
5. Unify symbols. (i.e. details inside of figure, not outside) (Sanders 
& McCormick, pg. 123, 1993) 
6. When displays will likely not usually be in the foveal field, 
emergent features should be used. (symbol features that change to 
indicate system state changes) (Scott & Findlay, 1991; Buttigieg et. 
al. 1991) 
7. The minimum acceptable visual angle is around 1 degree.
 
Assuming a distance from display around 3 ft, the symbol must at
 
least 0.5 in wide. (Proctor and Zandt, 1994)
 
8. Contrast variation can be used to indicate two different state
 
levels. (Sanders & McCormick, pg. 126, 1993)
 
c. Spacing and Organization 
1. Usually it is better to emphasize breadth over depth when 
designing menus for the display interface. (Norman, pg. 213, 1991) 
2. More frequently used options should be placed at the top of the 
menus, if they are to be used in the display to reduce reaction time. 
(Norman, pg. 244, 1991) 
3. Information displayed should be coherent, showing clear 
separations and a logical break-down of information. (Johnson, pg. 
33, 1992) 
4. If possible, use emergent features in symbol organization. 
(Buttigieg and Sanderson, 1991; Bennet ..1992) 
5. Order display objects keeping in mind that as the aspect ratio 
(width/height) of symbols is increased their perceived vertical 
grouping decreases. (Armstrong and Hoffman, 1990) 
d Depth Cues 
1.Be extremely cautious of using depth cues (i.e. linear perspective). 
(Stokes et. al., 1990) 
baseline alternate 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
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Table 6.4 (Continued) 
Design Guideline  baseline alternate 
e CRT Displays and Visual Fatigue 
1. Watch for visual fatigue, since readers of text on positive contrast 
CRT's (black background) can experience a "type of spatial 
frequency selective adaptation". (p. 340) (Travis, 1990) 59 
7. Experimental Method and Evaluation 
7.1 Introduction 
An introduction to the flight simulator, and how it interacted with the 
Agenda Manager system and user, is required before the details of the experiment can be 
properly explained. The description of this study will include the subjects chosen, 
experimental design, scenarios used, and user training program. Finally, the measures 
used to estimate agenda management performance will be described. 
7.2 The Flight Simulator 
The flight simulator used for the evaluation of the AgendaManager included 
components from both Ames and Langley NASA research centers. The primary and 
navigational flight displays were supplied by Ames, while the mode control panel, 
autopilot, and aircraft models were from Langley. These models were coded in both C 
and Fortran. Additional aircraft subsystem models and displays were developed at OSU, 
were coded in Smalltalk, and included engine, fuel, hydraulic, EICAS, adverse weather, 
and AC and DC electrical systems. Figure 7.1 is a representation of the overall layout of 
the primary flight display (PFD). horizontal situation indicator (HSI), autoflight (MCP), 
AgendaManager (AM), and secondary flight displays (SFD). 60 
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Figure 7.1 Overall flight simulator structure 
Two Silicon Graphics Indigo 2 workstations were used to run the simulator and 
display information to the pilot. On one workstation was the primary flight display, 
horizontal situation indicator, caution/warning indicator (above the PFD), and mode 
control panel while the other displayed the secondary flight displays and baseline 
AgendaManager display. This was done to better simulate an actual cockpit environment 
in which the secondary flight displays are not in the pilot's primary field of view (see 
Chapter 6 for more detail). The AgendaManager and secondary flight display pages were 
placed at an approximate 35 degree horizontal visual angle from the pilot, similar to that 
of the EICAS display on the Boeing 777. A physical barrier was constructed so the 
subject could not move his or her seat during the experiment to ensure the proper visual 
angle was maintained. 
To facilitate a simulation that ran in 'real' time, the computer programs used for 
the experiment were divided up among the SGI's to decrease the load on each computer. 
Unix socket connections were used for communication between the computers. The flight 
simulator and alternate AgendaManager interface ran on the left (see figure 7.1) SGI, 
while the AgendaManager and secondary flight systems ran on the right. The PFD and 
HSI, MCP, and main SFD page are displayed in figures 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4. Figures 7.5 and 
7.6 are the fuel and hydraulic system interfaces and are examples of the subsystem displays 
developed for the experiment. All of the displays used for the experiment can be found in 
Appendix A. 61 
Figure 7.2 Primary flight display(PFD) and horizontal situation indicator(HSI) 62 
Figure 7.3 Mode control panel (MCP) 
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Figure 7.4 Main secondary flight display (SFD) 63 
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Figure 7.5 Fuel system interface 
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Figure 7.6 Hydraulic system interface 
The experimenter acted as an ATC controller running the experiment from a third 
SGI positioned well behind the subject, declaring goals to the Agenda Manager through a 
Verbex automatic speech recognition system installed on a Gateway 2000 PC to reduce 
experimenter workload. 64 
7.2.1 Primary Flight Display & Horizontal Situation Indicator 
Information displayed on the primary flight display used for this study included 
airplane attitude, speed, altitude, autopilot modes, and take-off airspeed requirements. A 
wide variety of modes were available on the navigational display including VOR,  ILS, 
MLS, MAP, and PLAN. The function of these displays was to give the pilot horizontal 
situational awareness. 
For the experiment, the navigational mode presented was preset to MAP, and the 
subject could not adjust the settings in any way. The MAP mode provided the pilot with 
the current heading, position relative to surrounding VORs (very high frequency omni­
directional radio range), VORTACs (VOR with tactical air navigation), waypoints, and 
airports. The map scale was set to 20 miles per unit on the display. 
Flight paths were pre-programmed with a Flight Management System (FMS) and 
presented as a blue line on the MAP display. The subjects were instructed that they were 
not to follow those lines precisely, but to follow ATC commands. 
7.2.2 Mode Control Panel 
The mode control panel (MCP) was developed at the NASA Langley Research 
Center and was designed to model the autopilot modes ofa typical commercial transport 
aircraft. Modes supported by the Langley mode control panel included a variety of 
horizontal, vertical, and thrust modes. The autopilot modes used for this study as defined 
by Williams (1995) are described in table 7.1. 65 
Table 7.1 MCP modes used for this study 
mode  description 
Heading or Track Hold  Aircraft will follow heading or track. 
A/P Altitude Hold Mode  Aircraft will hold current altitude. 
A/P Vertical Speed (V/S) Mode  Aircraft will climb or descend at the set vertical 
speed (feet/minute). 
A/T Speed Mode  Aircraft uses thrust to hold current speed setting 
(IAS). 
Since these modes are often not mutually exclusive (i.e. you can have several 
modes engaged at any one time), and their interactions very complex, only the selected 
subset of these modes were required of the subject for use in the experiment. However, 
even with this small group of modes the subject needed training to ensure that he or she 
did not stall and crash the aircraft by setting too high a vertical speed rate (this mode takes 
precedence over IAS). 
These modes were also chosen because their activation from the mode control 
panel required the fewest steps for the subject (often as little as setting a number), and 
thereby the least training. They were also the simplest to understand, minimizing potential 
confusion. The experimenter concentrated training on the areas where the subjects 
appeared to be having trouble (most notably vertical speed during descent). 
7.2.3 Secondary Flight Displays 
All secondary flight displays and system models used for this research were 
programed by the OSU research team and are based upon information gathered from the 
NASA Advanced Concepts Flight Simulator (ACFS) (NASA, 1993), Boeing 737 (Boeing, 
August 1994), and Boeing 757 (Boeing, May 1994) flight manuals. Secondary flight 
displays developed for the study included pages for the fuel, electrical (AC, 270V DC, and 66 
28V DC), hydraulic, adverse weather, EICAS, power plants, and Agenda Manager 
interface. All but the EICAS and Agenda Manager interface displays opened directly on 
the main SFD to reduce the chances of the user inadvertently closing an important 
window. 
7.3 The Experiment 
7.3.1 Subjects 
Eight subjects were used in a balanced experimental design for data collection. 
Prior to data collection, three 'test' subjects performed the experiment for the purpose of 
eliminating any errors in the data collection, training, and computer programs. All 
subjects were general aviation pilots and halfwere instrument rated. Prior to the 
experiment an Oregon State University Internal Review Board For The Protection Of 
Human Subjects application was submitted and subsequently approved (see Appendix D). 
7.3.2 Experimental Design 
Independent variables involved in the design included the type of AgendaManager 
interface (treatment) used, the scenario, and the experimental run order, experimental run 
order being defined as the order in which the run was performed after training (first or 
second). Since the time commitment of each subject was limited to only a few hours, the 
influence of a 'learning effect' was considered during the generation of the design. 
The initial linear model used in the design of the experiment is presented by tables 
7.2 and 7.3. The model accounted for the effects upon the measures from the treatment 
(interface), period (first or second), scenario (#1 or #2), subject, subject instrument rating 
(yes/no), and random variation. This model was considered 'initial' since until the 
experimental runs were completed the level of 'balance' with regards to subject instrument 
rating (many of the subjects were not contacted until after the experiments had begun) was 
unknown. 67 
Table 7.2 The initial experimental model 
Yijklr = u + Ti + Pj + Sck + Jr + Sul + eijklr where, i = baseline or alternate, j = period 
1 or 2, k = scenario 1 or 2, r = rated or non-rated, and 1= subject number 
Table 7.3 The experimental effects 
Effect  Type 
T- treatment effect  fixed 
Sc - scenario effect  fixed 
P- period effect  random 
Su - subject effect  random 
I - Instrument Rating  random 
e - random variation  random 
The type of variable (fixed or random) assigned to most of the effects are fairly 
standard. The treatment effect is fixed (only applicable to our experiment) since both of 
the displays were designed specifically to present AgendaManager information.  The 
subject, instrument rating, and random variation are considered random since the subjects 
were considered to be randomly drawn from the total pilot population. 
However, while the scenario effect could have feasibly been either, it was 
determined to be fixed (the more conservative approach). While the scenarios were 
realistic (being created with the aid of air traffic controllers), they were also tailored to our 
aircraft simulator and environment and not entirely random. This limits the scope of 
inference of this study (to these scenarios) but was deemed a more accurate account of the 
experimental situation. 
The period effect was considered random since while the sequence of runs (one 
and two) was consistent, the time of day, week, and month of the experiments were not. 
In addition, the period effect was considered random since it is essentially a conglomerate 68 
of learning, fatigue, and motivation effects combined with the wide array of variability 
between humans that would seem impossible to 'fix'. 
Table 7.4 The experimental design 
RUN 1  RUN 2 
Subject  Display Type  Scenario  Display Type  Scenario 
1  baseline  1  alternate  2 
2  baseline  1  alternate  2 
3  baseline  2  alternate  1 
4  baseline  2  alternate  1 
5  alternate  1  baseline  2 
6  alternate  1  baseline  2 
7  alternate  2  baseline  1 
8  alternate  2  baseline  1 
Each of the eight subjects participated in the experiment according to their 
randomly assigned subject number. Pilot experience (if instrument rated) was blocked in 
the design through a process assuring random placement while not allowing all of the 
instrument rated pilots to be placed in one group with respect to display type order. The 
subject's instrument rating was deemed a superior measure of piloting skill (as compared 
to gross flight hours) since it is an industry standard, and a set knowledge and skill base is 
required. 
7.3.3 General Experimental Procedure 
The entire experimental run lasted a little less than four hours. Table 7.5 describes 
the overall experimental procedure. 69 
Table 7.5 Experimental procedure 
Activity  Time 
overview, consent form, pre-experiment questionnaire  5-10 min 
training (see table 7.6 for description)  1.5-2 hrs 
break  10 min 
experimental run #1  25-30 min 
break  5 min 
experimental run#2  25-30 min 
post-experiment questionnaire  10 min 
A brief overview of the research being conducted by the OSU human factors 
group followed by the subjects filling out the experimental consent form and pre-
experiment questionnaire (see Appendix D) began the experiment. Training lasted 
between one and half and two hours (depending on the subject) and is described in detail 
on table 7.6. A ten minute break followed the training upon which the first experimental 
run was conducted. Following a five minute break the second experimental run was 
concluded. Upon completion of the experimental runs the subjects filled out a post-
experiment questionnaire (see Appendix D). The experimental runs (scenarios) each 
lasted about thirty minutes. 
73.4 Scenarios 
The basic scenarios used for this experiment were developed with the help of Steve 
Kretsinger, an air traffic controller from the Eugene Air Traffic Control Tower, and Rolf 
Braune, an aviation psychologist and former test pilot from Boeing. One flight was from 
Eugene, Oregon, to Portland, Oregon, while the other was a route from Portland to 70 
Figure 7.7 Eugene to Portland route 
Eugene. Figure 7.7 is an illustration of the Eugene to Portland route while more detailed 
routes can be seen in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
Subsystem faults encountered by the subjects were in a different order for each 
scenario, though the types of faults in each scenario were generally the same. The subjects 
faced the same array of subsystem faults during both scenarios, but in a different order. 
This was done to both minimize the learning effect and keep the level of difficulty of the 
scenarios as equivalent as possible. 71 
The subsystem faults were initiated during the scenarios in a well planned 
sequence. For example, fault sequence A (see Appendix C - scenario 1 graphic) consisted 
of a hydraulic pump failure and a fuel pressure fault. This was done to facilitate the study 
of several agenda management performance measures (see table 7.9) as well as to increase 
subject workload. 
Goal conflicts were initiated by the experimenter from the master control panel 
(see figure 7.8) by the covert alteration of autopilot heading, speed, or altitude settings. 
Heading goal conflicts were initiated during wide angle turns after the subject had finished 
resetting the autopilot (A/P) following ATC commands. Altitude goal conflicts were 
initiated during significant altitude changes, and speed goal conflicts were initiated during 
speed changes. Therefore, the goal conflicts were designed to be fairly difficult to detect 
with minimal cues being provided by more traditional displays (e.g., PFD attitude 
indicator). 
Both textual and graphical interpretations of the scenarios were generated for use 
by the experimenter during the experiment and can be found in Appendices B and C. An 
overt goal communication method developed by Cha (1996), employing voice input, was 
used to recognize pilot aircraft control goals through air traffic control commands given 
by the experimenter. Subsystem faults and goal conflicts were initiated through the master 
control panel from the experimenter's workstation (a third SGI) figure 7.8. 72 
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Figure 7.8 The master control panel 
Subjects, performing the role of a pilot flying, were instructed to use the autopilot 
during the scenario. A former Boeing test pilot, Rolf Braune, aided with the fine tuning of 
the length and timing of the departure and approach phases of the flights to ensure the 
feasibility of the required flight tasks. While the scenarios were feasible, they were also 
designed to be quite challenging to impose a high level of workload on the pilot. This was 
done to increase the likelihood of measurable differences in subject performance between 
the two interfaces. 73 
7.3.5 Training 
The training routine required of the subjects included systems introductions, fault 
correction procedures, AgendaManager display orientation, and a practice scenario. 
Subjects were introduced to the PFD, HSI, MCP, Systems Simulator, and 
AgendaManager. Table 7.5 is the training checklist used during the experiment. 
Table 7.6 Training checklist 
Part I - Introduction 
1. Primary Flight Display 
2. Horizontal Situation Indicator 
3. Mode Control Panel 
4. Systems Simulator 
5. Agenda Manager (Baseline Display) 
Part II - Subsystem Fault Correction 
1. Hydraulic System 
2. Fuel System 
3. AC Electrical System 
4. Adverse Weather 
5. Power Plants 
Part III - Practice Scenario 
1. LAX area 
2. Heading, Speed, Altitude Commands 
3. Subsystem Faults 
Part IV - Alternate Display - show *.tif picture 
The subjects used the baseline AgendaManager display during the practice 
scenario since the alternate AgendaManager interface was considered a treatment. A 
static picture of the alternate display was presented (and functions described) immediately 
before the experimental run involving that display. This minimized any additional learning 
effect between runs (which would be significant if another training scenario were 
employed). 74 
Instructions concerning the interpretation of information presented on each 
AgendaManager interface were given verbally from a prepared checklist. Included in the 
instructions were how to interpret a goal's status (color coding & location), priority (color 
coding & location), source, and conflicts. 
7.4 The Measures 
Five types of data were collected during and after the experiment to evaluate the 
corresponding AgendaManager interfaces. They included a measure of the subject's use 
of the autopilot, goal conflict resolution time, subsystem goal correction time, task 
prioritization accuracy, and subject response on post-experiment questionnaires. 
Since the scenarios were mostly performed using the autopilot, a traditional root 
mean square measure of flightpath error would have been inappropriate because that 
would have measured the performance of the autopilot itself. Therefore, the navigational 
performance of the pilot was measured by the length of time until the correct autopilot 
setting was entered following changes in ATC clearance. The length of time until a goal 
conflict initiated by the experimenter was resolved (by the pilot re-setting the autopilot) 
was used to measure goal conflict performance. 
As mentioned earlier, pilots are becoming ever more reliant on the aircraft's 
automated systems and many fly little of any modern route manually. Therefore,  any 
realistic evaluation of a modern commercial jet system must include significant use of an 
autopilot. While this also measures the performance of the pilots in regard to the use of 
the autopilot, since the data that the analysis focused on was within-subject, variation 
between subjects in autopilot performance could be disregarded. 
Subsystem goal performance was measured by the time needed to correct a 
subsystem fault. Table 7.6 describes the subsystem faults encountered by the subjects, and 
the steps required to correct them. 75 
Table 7.7 Non-normal procedure plates
 
*Format based on 757 Operations Manual & 777 documentation
 
restore L or R HYD SYS PRESS
 
Turn Available System Pumps  ON 
If None 
Power Transfer Unit  OPEN 
correct L/R ENG/ELEC HYD PUMP 
Turn Hydraulic Pump  OFF 
restore L or  R FUEL SYS PRESS 
Turn Available System Pumps  ON 
If None 
Fuel System Isolation Valves  OPEN 
increase FUEL TEMP 
Turn both fuel tank heaters  ON 
correct L or R  ENGINE FIRE 
Fire Retardant Discharge  DEPRESS 
restore C HYD SYS PRESS
 
Turn Available System Pumps  ON 
remove  L or  R ENGINE ICING 
Adverse Weather SFD Page  ON 
Turn All De-Ice Systems  ON 
correct FUEL BALANCE 
Fuel System Isolation Valves  OPEN 
Fuel System Side With More Fuel: 
Pumps  ON 
Fuel System Side With Less Fuel: 
Pumps  OFF 
Continue Until Balanced Then: 
All Available Fuel System Pumps  ON 
Fuel System Isolation Valves  CLOSED 
correct L or R FUEL PUMP 
Turn Fuel Pump  OFF 
restore - MAIN AC BUS '#' OFF 
APU  ON 
Bus Tie Contactors  ON 
Line Contactor Leading to Bus  ON 
Task prioritization was measured by initiating multiple subsystem failures at the 
same time. The correct response for the pilot was to do the higher priority subsystem goal 
first. Using EICAS as a guide, the subsystem faults were rated according to the 
previously discussed warning, caution, and advisory basis. A goal rated as a warning was 76 
higher in priority than caution, which was higher in priority than advisory. The following 
tables list the subsystem goal hierarchy, which is based upon EICAS standards, and the 
fault sequences encountered by the pilot in the scenarios as mentioned in section 7.3. 
Table 7.8 Subsystem goal hierarchy 
Goal  Priority 
correct L or R ENGINE FIRE  3 - warning 
restore L, R or C HYD SYS PRESS  2 - caution 
restore L or R FUEL SYS PRESS  2 - caution 
increase FUEL TEMP  2 - caution 
restore MAIN AC BUS OFF  2 - caution 
correct FUEL BALANCE  1 - advisory 
correct L or R HYD PUMP  1 - advisory 
correct L or R FUEL PUMP  1 - advisory 
remove L or R ENGINE ICING  1 - advisory 77 
Table 7.9 Subsystem fault sequences 
Fault Sequence (scenario) 
A (1) 
B (1) 
C (1) 
D (1) 
E (2) 
F (2) 
G (2) 
H (2) 
I (2) 
Faults (priority) 
left fuel system pressure (2) 
left hydraulic engine pump failure (1) 
AC bus 1 off (2) 
fuel balance (1) 
right power plant fire (3) 
right fuel system pressure (2) 
left power plant fire (3) 
left hydraulic electric pump failure (1) 
AC bus 4 off (2)
 
fuel balance (1)
 
left hydraulic system pressure (2)
 
left fuel system pump (1)
 
right power plant fire (3)
 
left hydraulic engine pump failure (1) 
center hydraulic system failure (2)
 
engine icing (1)
 
right fuel system pressure (2)
 
left hydraulic electric pump failure (1) 
Subjects were asked to respond to pre and post questionnaires (see Appendix D). 
They were asked to numerically rate between -10 to 10 the effectiveness of each display 
on the post-experiment questionnaire. The performance measures used for this 
experiment are summed up in table 7.10. 78 
Table 7.10 Experimental measures 
Measure  Data Type 
autopilot use  time to reset autopilot (seconds) 
goal conflict resolution  time to resolve conflict (seconds) 
subsystem management  time to correct fault (seconds) 
task prioritization  % correct 
user satisfaction  number (-10 to 10) 79 
8. Results & Analysis 
8.1 Introduction 
The results and analysis from the experiment are presented in this chapter. 
Included are information gathered from post-experiment questionnaires, measures 
collected via computer output, and interpretations from the analysis of that information. 
8.2 Results 
Eleven subjects participated in the experiment. The first three were used as a 'test' 
group to fine tune the experimental scenarios, data collection, and training procedures. 
Data used for this analysis was collected from the following eight subjects. 
8.2.1 Pre-Experiment Questionnaires 
Four of the subjects were instrument rated. All eight subjects averaged 592 hours 
of flying time with a standard deviation of 512. The instrument rated pilots averaged 
1,038 hours flying time with a standard deviation of 356, while the non-instrument rated 
pilots averaged 146 hours of flying time with a standard deviation of only 17. 
One subject stated that they got a little less than usual (1/2 hr less) sleep the night 
before, another stated they had a cold, and another subject stated that they were a little 
tired from a long weekend drive. No subject was taking any medications that could effect 
the study and none listed more than one thing that could have effected their performance 
(e.g. illness, lack of sleep, medications, & other). The aforementioned factors appeared 
very minor and did not seem to effect the results in any fashion. 
8.2.2 Computer Output Measures 
The numerical averages of the experimental results can be found on table 8.1, and 
graphic representations in figures 8.1 and 8.2. A higher value for the measure in figure 8.1 80 
is considered better, while in figure 8.2 a smaller value is interpreted as an indication of 
superior performance. A data summary from the experiment can be found in Appendix E. 
Subjects tended to prioritize tasks slightly better (5.6% - [p = .14621) with the text 
display, but this effect was not statistically significant. The alternate display improved 
flying performance by 18 percent (p=.6898, not sig.). The PFD graphic display 
enhancements improved overall subsystem management performance by 5 percent 
(p=.8870), but reduced goal conflict performance by almost 3 percent (p=.7860, not sig.). 
Table 8.1 Baseline vs. alternate display comparisons (averages) 
measure (units)  baseline display  alternate display 
prioritization (percent)  94.40%  88.80% 
flying performance (seconds)  11.1  9.1 
subsystem performance (seconds)  21.2  20.1 
goal conflict performance (seconds)  36.7  37.7 81 
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Figure 8.1 Average subject prioritization and flying performance 
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Figure 8.2 Average subject flying, subsystem, and goal conflict performance 82 
8.2.3 Post-Experiment Questionnaires 
Written responses from the post-experiment questionnaires revealed several 
aspects concerning the pilots' impressions of the displays. First, the majority (5/8) 
preferred the baseline versus the alternate display. Subjects preferred the baseline display 
to the alternate display by an average weighting (-10 to 10 scale) of 7.9 to 5.5 (p=.2685). 
The positive ratings indicate that the participants considered both displays helpful. 
Three subjects noted that they significantly used the caution/warning indicator as a 
cue to look at the text display. Two subjects mentioned the helpfulness of the graphic 
subsystem fault indicator (part of the alternate display), while one subject stated that the 
arrows (part of the alternate display) cluttered the primary flight display. 
8.3 Analysis of Results 
A split-plot ANOVA was performed for each performance measure. A split-plot 
design was used since there was a between-subject parameter of interest (subject 
instrument rating) along with within-subject parameters (time, scenario, display, residual 
...). A more detailed description of the initial mathematical model used for the analysis 
can be found in chapter 7. 
As stated previously, until the actual break-up of instrument to non-instrument 
rated pilots was known, the interaction effects that are analyzable could not be 
determined. Although four instrument rated and four non-instrument rated pilots were 
used for study, they were only balanced with respect to display (they were not balanced 
with respect to scenario since it was not known until the end of the study that the ratio 
would be even) so only one interaction effect can feasibly be studied. The interaction 
effect chosen was rating times period. Table 8.2 presents the final experimental model 
used for the ANOVA analysis for this study. 83 
Table 8.2 The final experimental model 
Yijklr = u + Ti + 11+ Sck + Ir + Sul + Pj*Ir +eijldr where, i = baseline or alternate, j = 
period 1 or 2, k = scenario 1 or 2, r = rated or non-rated, and 1= subject number 
A statistical analysis software program named SAS was used to analyze the data. Tables 
8.3, 8.4, 8.5, 8.6, and 8.7 are the analytical results for each measured parameter. 
Table 8.3 Prioritization ANOVA 
Source  DF  Type I SS  Mean Square F Value  Pr > F 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
RATING  1  0.00015625  0.00015625  0.005  0.946 
SUBJECT(RATING) 6  0.17968750  0.02994792 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
PERIOD  1  0.01890625  0.01890625  4.84  0.0927 
SCENARIO  1  0.00140625  0.00140625  0.36  0.5808 
DISPLAY  1  0.01265625  0.01265625  3.24  0.1462 
RATING*PERIOD  1  0.04515625  0.04515625  11.56  0.0273 
Error  4  0.01562500  0.00390625 
Table 8.4 Flying performance ANOVA 
Source  DF  Type I SS  Mean Square F Value  Pr > F 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
RATING  1  15.21000000  15.21000000  6.999  0.038 
SUBJECT(RATING) 6  13.03750000  2.17291667 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
PERIOD  1  11.22250000  11.22250000  0.54  0.5016 
SCENARIO  1  26.01000000  26.01000000  1.26  0.3243 
DISPLAY  1  3.80250000  3.80250000  0.18  0.6898 
RATING*PERIOD  1  1.96000000  1.96000000  0.10  0.7733 
Error  4  82.49500000  20.62375000 84 
Table 8.5 Subsystem performance ANOVA 
Source  DF  Type I SS  Mean Square F Value  Pr > F 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
RATING  1  64.00000000  64.00000000  2.11  0.1975 
SUBJECT(RATING) 6  182.41750000  30.40291667 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
PERIOD  1  33.06250000  33.06250000  0.28  0.6259 
SCENARIO  1  44.89000000  44.89000000  0.38  0.5721 
DISPLAY  1  2.72250000  2.72250000  0.02  0.8870 
RATING*PERIOD  1  16.81000000  16.81000000  0.14  0.7260 
Error  4  475.59500000  118.89875000 
Table 8.6 Goal conflict resolution ANOVA 
Source  DF  Type I SS  Mean Square F Value  Pr > F 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
RATING  1  21.39062500  21.39062500  0.286  0.618 
SUBJECT(RATING) 6  449.33875000  74.88979167 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
PERIOD  1  173.58062500  173.58062500  3.95  0.1179 
SCENARIO  1  2.32562500  2.32562500  0.05  0.8294 
DISPLAY  1  3.70562500  3.70562500  0.08  0.7860 
RATING*PERIOD  1  153.14062500  153.14062500  3.48  0.1354 
Error  4  175.88250000  43.97062500 
Table 8.7 Preference rating ANOVA 
Source  DF  Type I SS  Mean Square F Value  Pr > F 
BETWEEN SUBJECTS 
RATING  1  5.06250000  5.06250000  1.128  0.340 
SUBJECT(RATING) 6  26.87500000  4.47916667 
WITHIN SUBJECTS 
PERIOD  1  5.06250000  5.06250000  0.37  0.5759 
SCENARIO  1  45.56250000  45.56250000  3.33  0.1421 
DISPLAY  1  22.56250000  22.56250000  1.65  0.2685 
RATING*PERIOD  1  1.56250000  1.56250000  0.11  0.7524 
Error  4  54.75000000  13.68750000 85 
8.4 Interpretation of Results 
A p-value of less than .1 was considered significant for this study. A value 
between .1 and .15 was considered suggestive. Effects considered for this study were 
instrument rating, period, scenario, display, and rating*period. The interpretation of 
results will be organized in accordance to the response measured including correct 
prioritization, flying performance, subsystem management, goal conflict resolution, and 
the subject's display preference rating. 
8.4.1 Prioritization 
The prioritization performance of the subjects was defined as the percentage of 
time the correct subsystem fault (when given two at a time) was corrected first. 
On table 8.2 two p-values are significant and one is suggestive. They were the 
period effect (p = .0927), rating*period effect (p = .0273), and the display effect (p = 
.1462). Subjects averaged a 95% correct prioritization rate during the first period with 
seven of eight runs being a perfect 100%. They averaged an 88% correct prioritization 
percentage during the second period while only half scored a perfect 100%. In addition, 
three of the four instrument rated pilots scored perfect during their first period, but 80% 
or below on the second period. It is clear that the subjects tended to do a poorer job of 
prioritizing subsystem tasks during the second experimental run. 
There is suggestive evidence that the pilots did a poorer job prioritizing tasks with 
the alternate display versus the baseline display. As seen in figure 8.1, the pilots 
prioritized tasks 5% better with the baseline display. 
It would be tempting to label the significant differences as fatigue or disinterest 
since it was clear that subjects (especially instrument rated) did a poorer job prioritizing 
tasks during the second experimental run. However, since both measures were near 100% 
causing there distributions to be highly non-normal, anything beyond stating the possibility 
of such a factor cannot be justified since one of the assumptions made for the ANOVA F-
test analysis is that the distribution is normal. 86 
A non-parametric test (rank sum - U test) on the period effect was performed, and 
no difference between the means was found (z = .2184). However, since so many of the 
values were the same (only four ranks out of sixteen measures were plausible) the test had 
very little power with the variance of the statistic many times larger than the mean. 
8.4.2 Flying Performance 
The flying performance of the subjects was defined as the average number of 
seconds needed to correctly re-program the autopilot. 
The only effect that was statistically significant was the subjects' instrument rating. 
However, the effect was the exact opposite of what would be expected. The instrument 
rated pilots performed worse than the non-instrument rated pilots (p = .038). Flying 
performance (in seconds) for the instrument rated pilots averaged 10.4, and for non-
instrument rated pilots 8.6. 
Another disturbing aspect of the analysis of this measure is that the within-subject 
variation was larger than between-subject variation. The pilots averaged 7.8, 8.4, 8.7, 9.3, 
9.6, 9.7, 11.3, and 12.0 seconds to perform each flying performance function, while the 
differences between experimental runs (within-subject) were .5, 1.5, 1.7, 2.3, 3.5, 3.8, 5.6, 
and 13.5, both in ascending order. These sequences of numbers demonstrates the 
magnitude in which the within-subject variation was larger than the between-subject 
variation. The most likely explanation is the inherent variability present in all humans. 
An 18% improvement in flying performance when subjects were using the alternate 
display was not statistically significant but may be noteworthy. Because subject 
instrument rating was a significant factor, the potential power (sensitivity) of display effect 
was severely reduced. As with any set of measures, when one happens to be statistically 
significant other effects may become mathematically 'clouded'. 87 
8.4.3 Subsystem Performance 
The subsystem management performance of the subjects was defined as the 
average number of seconds needed by the subjects to alter a subsystem's state to correct a 
fault. 
There were no significant effects on pilot subsystem management performance. 
While not statistically significant, the time needed for non-instrument rated pilots to 
correct a subsystem fault averaged 17.7 seconds, while the instrument rated pilots needed 
an average of 23.6 seconds. Thereby, it is possible that the instrument rated pilots also 
performed worse on the aircraft subsystem management tasks required by the flight 
scenarios. 
As with the flying performance measure, and seen on table 8.3, the within-subject 
variation was larger then the between-subject variation. It appears that the high degree of 
variability within humans, combined with the overall small number of subjects available, 
contributed to this statistical anomaly. 
8.4.4 Goal Conflict Resolution 
The goal conflict resolution performance of the subjects was defined as the 
average number of seconds needed by the subjects to recognize and correct (by resetting 
the autopilot) a goal conflict. 
There were no statistically significant effects affecting goal conflict resolution time. 
However, a period effect of .1179 indicated the possible presence of a learning effect in 
this measure. The average time required for the subjects to resolve a goal conflict during 
the first experimental run was 40.5 seconds, while the average for period 2 was 33.9 
seconds. 
In addition a rating*period effect of .1354 was present with the instrument rated 
pilots showing an average improvement of 12.8 seconds versus an insignificant .4 seconds 
for the non-instrument rated pilots. This could indicate a difference in the level learning 
demonstrated by the pilots, or possibly a difference in the level of goal conflict resolution 88 
training given to the subjects. Also, the non-instrument pilots could have been better 
trained by the experimenter to handle this contingency. 
8.4.5 Subject Preference 
There were no statistically significant effects concerning the preference rating 
assigned to each display by the participants. A p-value of .1421  was attributed to the 
scenarios and it appears that subjects which ran a display using scenario 1, evaluated that 
display somewhat lower. Although this implies a possible difficulty  contrast between the 
scenarios, it should be noted that the scenario effect was insignificant with every other 
measured performance parameter. 
8.4.6 General Comments 
The effect that was the primary focus of this study, the displays, was not a 
significant factor for any measure. There is a suggestive evidence concerning 
prioritization performance, but given the nature of the data (both near 100%), it is likely 
random variation. There is a possibility of a mild display effect regarding subject flying 
performance, but since instrument rating was a significant factor any statistical basis for 
that claim is unobtainable. 
Scenarios did not appear to effect any subject performance measures, though a 
slight connection to the subjective display preference parameter could be made.  It could 
therefore be concluded that the scenarios were essentially equivalent justifying the 'round­
trip' philosophy used for their development. 
Period effects appeared a significant factor in a reduction in prioritization 
performance, and a suggestive factor in the improvement of goal conflict resolution 
performance. The reduction in prioritization performance is potential evidence of subject 
fatigue or disinterest during the approximately 3 hours of training and experimental runs. 
Caution should be used with this measure since it was highly non-normally distributed and 
a non-parametric test performed of the data lacked the resolution necessary to detect a 89 
difference.  Improvement in goal conflict performance, although only suggestive, 
indicates the possibility that a learning effect was present with this measure. 
Whether the subject was instrument rated or not was a factor in several 
performance areas (both statistically significant and suggestive). Contraryto previous 
prejudices made prior to the experiment, the instrument rated pilots appeared to do 
significantly worse than non-instrument pilots. 
Three possible explanations for this between-subject factor appear plausible. The 
instrument rated pilots could have just happened to be inferior to the non-instrument rated 
pilots, the experimenter could have subconsciously under-trained the instrument rated 
pilots or over-trained the non-instrument rated pilots (see goal conflict resolution 
rating*period effect), and the experimenter could have subconsciously run the 
experimental differently depending on the subjects instrument rating. 
Since the experimenter knew the instrument rating of the pilot prior to the 
experiment, the latter two explanations appear quite probable. Unfortunately, since it was 
deemed necessary to block subject instrument rating in the experimental design, that 
particular transition of information could not be avoided. 90 
9. Conclusions & Recommendations 
9.1 Introduction 
Recommendations concerning which Agenda Manager display(s) should be used 
for the overall Agenda Manager evaluation will be the focus of this chapter. Before these 
recommendations can be made, the limits of the study conducted must be explored and 
general conclusions obtained from the experimental results examined. 
9.2 Study Limitations 
While the fidelity of the aircraft simulator used for this experiment was superior to 
that used for Kim's (1994) study, several shortcomings were present. Many tasks that are 
a part of aircraft flights were not required for this experiment. The pilots had no outside 
field of view to observe, so their focus could always remain on the displays since they did 
not need to monitor their environment (e.g. look for traffic). Having to look for air traffic 
could have significantly altered the subject's scan patterns, and hence the outcome of a 
cockpit display related study. 
Subsystem models were fairly realistic, but certain subsystem models (especially 
power plants) were not fully developed and the models were not integrated (e.g. an AC 
bus failure leading to the failure of the hydraulic pump to which it supplies power). 
Subjects were not required to verbally respond to the experimenter's air traffic 
control (ATC) clearances, eliminating a communication task. In addition, no co-pilot was 
involved in this study so no within cockpit communication was required. 
The general aviation pilots were not familiar with modern graphic primary flight 
(PFD), secondary (SFD), and horizontal situation indicator (HSI) displays. This may have 
reduced their overall performance and biased them towards the text AgendaManager 
display due to its similarity to operational checklists employed by all pilots for flight 
management purposes. They were also not familiar with the high level of subsystem 
complexity present in commercial aircraft. 91 
As noted in chapter 8, for several of the measures the within-subject variability was 
greater than the between-subject variability. Since the experimenter for this study was not 
`blinded' to the skill level of each pilot or display they were using, there is a significant 
chance of experimenter induced variability within this study. This could have been 
manifested by changes in the diligence level of subject training, alterations in scenario 
timing, or level of experimenter attention to experiment conditions. 
Another factor affecting the experimental results was the large number of effects 
that were considered for this study. In addition to the parameter of interest, display effect, 
period, scenario, and instrument rating effects were also analyzed in this study. The 
period effect was unavoidable in a study involving sequential runs, but the others could be 
justifiably eliminated or confounded. 
Using two different scenarios for the study may have reduced subject learning (part 
of the period effect), but it also added an additional effect to the analysis, thus reducing 
the sensitivity of the analysis. Because of the relatively small number of available  subjects, 
a mix of instrument and non-instrument rated pilots was used for this study. This added 
an instrument rating effect reducing the power of the analysis but was considered 
unavoidable when the experiment was designed. Some recommendations concerningthe 
elimination and confounding of the scenario and instrument rating effects for studies of 
this nature can be found in the following section. 
9.3 General Conclusions & Recommendation for Future Research 
First and foremost, the graphic additions to the baseline AgendaManager display 
appeared to have little, if any, effect on subject agenda management performance. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the graphic displays did not improve pilot agenda 
management performance in this experimental environment. 
The aforementioned conclusion may simply be evidence for the successful 
application of the display design checklist developed for this thesis (see chapter 5) to both 
the baseline and alternative displays. Thus, it appears that the visual display design 
guidelines proved to be quite useful for the design of the AgendaManager displays.  It 92 
seems quite likely that the concepts presented in the guide (see table 5.2) could be helpful 
in the development of any visual display. 
Almost half of the subjects recalled that they used the caution/warning indicator on 
the PFD as a cue to view the baseline AgendaManager display. It is possible that the 
experimental subjects developed a scanning pattern which reduced the potential 
effectiveness of the graphic displays since the subjects were already viewing the text 
display on the secondary flight display when the graphic displays could have aided the 
most. 
Sanders and McCormick (1993) note that, in general, graphics are important for 
user processing speed while a textual format facilitates accuracy. Since the simplified 
graphics incorporated into the alternate AgendaManager display did not improve subject 
flight management performance, it could be argued that the complexity of information 
inherent to agenda management lends itself to a textual display format. There are simply 
so many 'chunks' of information associated with each goal that minor improvements in 
user reaction time (possibly in milliseconds) due to the alternative display graphics are 
insignificant in relation to the overall decision making process required of the pilot. 
There was evidence of period effects (both learning and fatigue) in the experiment. 
Subjects should have been better trained to resolve goal conflicts since some evidence of 
learning was present with that measure. Having both subject training and experimental 
runs during the same session might have induced a measure of fatigue on the subjects as 
evident by the significant (negative) period effect on task prioritization performance. 
Scenarios designed in a 'round-trip' fashion appear to be roughly equivalent while 
possibly reducing subject learning. Flight scenarios designed in this fashion could 
probably be assumed roughly equivalent in any future study and confounded with the 
period effects in the mathematical model of the experiment. This would increase the 
power of the analysis while potentially reducing any learning effects. See chapter 7 and 
Appendices B & C for more information and detail concerning the scenarios. 
The most striking conclusion of this study was the significance and direction of the 
performance differences between instrument rated and non-instrument rated pilots. An 
instrument rating seemed to be a hindrance to subject performance rather than an asset. 93 
While the two most plausible explanations for this effect are experimenter interference and 
a true skill level difference caused by random variation in the subject populations, it would 
be wise for any future study utilizing general aviation pilots consider this effect and at least 
`blind' the experimenter to the subject's instrument rating status. Another option, if 
enough subjects are available, would be to either use only instrument rated or non-
instrument rated pilots. Finally, the production and use of either video-taped or hard-
copied documentation for system training might help eliminate some variability. 
9.4 AgendaManager Display Recommendations 
With no real difference in subject agenda management performance between the 
baseline (text) display and the alternate display the recommendation of this thesis is to use 
the baseline display for the overall evaluation of the AgendaManager. This will reduce 
simulator complexity and enhance system performance by eliminating computer socket 
connections that the AgendaManager graphic display requires. 
While it appears that a textual display format is more applicable to the type of 
information presented to the pilot by the AgendaManager, there still may be some benefit 
to the separation of aircraft control and subsystem goals due to their inherent differences, 
as described in chapter 6. 
Figure 9.1 is an example of such a text-based display format. The flightcrew and 
autopilot speed, altitude, and heading goals are placed at the top of the display adjacent to 
one another, and cue the pilot to goal conflicts by text message differences. Highlighting 
of the conflicting goals is added for emphasis. Subsystem goals would be presented in 
EICAS fashion in a separate display at the bottom of the page since aircraft control goals 
and goal conflicts are deemed more critical and placed above. 
The aircraft control and subsystem goals would be efficiently separated and unlike 
the baseline display always in the same location and order. Pilots would always know 
where to look to find their heading, altitude, or speed goals reducing reaction time and the 
potential for goal confusion. This confusion was evident several times during training 
sessions (though not directly measured) when a few of the subjects occasionally inverted 
ATC commands thinking the heading goal (e.g. 240) was the speed goal (e.g. 260) or 94 
vice-versa. By not mixing the aircraft control and subsystem goals, the organization of the 
textual information might be easier to comprehend and interpret. 
This type of text display would also integrate more efficiently with current EICAS 
formats, quite possibly enabling an AgendaManager type system to be regarded as merely 
an 'extension' of EICAS and accepted as an industry standard in a far more prompt 
fashion. 
Potential drawbacks to this format are that unsatisfactory goals would be scattered 
throughout the display, the relative importance between individual aircraft control, goal 
conflicts, and subsystem goals may be harder to ascertain, and that this informational 
separation scheme has yet to be proven (unlike the baseline display used for this study and 
the CTMS display from Kim's study). 
From the information displayed on figure 9.1, the current agenda can be described. 
The speed goal is currently satisfied at 260 knots. The aircraft's heading is also 
satisfactory and being maintained at 230 degrees. However, there is a goal conflict 
between the flightcrew's altitude goal and autopilot altitude setting. The autopilot's 
heading, speed, and/or altitude goals are only displayed if there is a goal conflict. 
There are also two subsystem states that are not satisfactory. The left fuel 
pressure is low and an AC bus is off. These messages are presented in almost identical 
fashion to current EICAS methodology. This type of format could present this 
AgendaManager agenda management system as essentially an 'extension of EICAS'. 
Regardless of the textual format of the AgendaManager display used for the 
upcoming AgendaManager evaluation, the text coding (e.g. color) schemes should be 
evaluated to ensure that they correspond exactly with EICAS since the subjects for that 
study will be familiar with EICAS coding methodology. This would include aircraft 
control goals and goal conflicts (this study only standardized subsystem AgendaManager 
goals). Unlike the general aviation pilots used for this study, the AgendaManager 
evaluation will use experienced line pilots who will bring their past EICAS experience into 
the study. 95
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ri 
ALL 
5 
ra 
ZSI11111 
I ;"; 
6 
V2  143 
VS  114 
V1  131 
VIRFF  1.19 
TBK  L211 
Nr4 
24 
20 
Figure A.1 - PFD & HSI 104 
..p.:,,.-.;;;;;;;,:4,0" 
Figure A.2 - Mode control panel 
;,:.,:,::::;;;44:.:4:,:,;:" 
Figure A.3 - SFD page 105 
Generator 
Di3connect 
Load .% 
Volts 
Line 
Contactor 
Main 
Bum Tie 
Contactor 
Figure A.4 - AC electrical system 
....  .. . 
Figure A.5 - DC 270V 106 
. 
: 
AC 1 
111 
Circuit
Breaker 
Load 
Volts 
MNII  MitiM I 
8113 
[Men) 
;quilt) ......... 
-17:344.o  iLbs 
...............
 E=} deg F 
ØFF  heat 
r 
AC 4 
R2 
Nam 
Volts 
Bates) 
Figure A.6 - DC 28V 
.  sr*.  523Vi: 
istiwton valves 
Figure A.7 - Fuel system 107 
I lydrat:Iie. Pumps
 
I  (*ICC  Z
 
17:771. 
riflisl Air 
Figure A.8 - Hydraulic system 
Figure A.9 - Adverse weather system 108 
POWER PLANTS 
EPR  N1  EGT  FF 
Figure A.10 - Power plant 1
 
Figure A.11 - Power plant 2
 ..x.)",:44,4,0:0X.,:,,,,:,,,,:fv,:,*!,,M.:40,-,X,:,,C,C.,:,:{.K.M.:<:,,,,Y0:.% .. 110 
APPENDIX B - Portland to Eugene Scenario
 111 
Appendix B - Portland to Eugene Scenario SCENARIO #2 
OSU 037 FMC Plane Portland-Eugene Scenario 
2/7/97 
Initial Conditions:	  Lat/Long -- 45.58N/122.60W 
Alt  27 MSL  Freq  118.7 Mhz 
Spd -- 0 KIAS  Hdg -- 279 MAG (Runway 28R) 
Flaps -- n/a 
EVENTS 
OSU 037, ready for 
clearance delivery 
OSU 037, ready for take-off. 
OSU 037 parking brake off , 
full  throttle, and takes-off. 
OSU 037 at 1400 
OSU 037 at 200 
OSU 037 at 6000 
ATC 
OSU 037, Portland Ground. 
Cleared to Eugene via River 
4 departure, Newberg, Victor 
495. Climb and maintain 
9000. Expect 14000 5 
minutes after departure. 
Increase speed to 2-1-0, 
during take-off. 
OSU 037, Eugene Tower, 
runway 2-8, cleared for 
take-off. 
OSU 037 contact Departure 
OSU 037, Portland 
Departure, radar contact. 
Turn left heading 2-5-0. 
OSU 037, turn left heading 
2-1-0. Increase speed to 2­
6-0. Alt. indicates 6200. 
OSU 037 
Cleared to Eugene via River 
4 departure, Newberg, Victor 
495. Maintain 9000,
 
expecting 14000 5 minutes
 
after departure.
 
Portland Tower, OSU 037, 
ready for take-off on runway 
28R. 
Cleared for take-off on 
Runway 28. 
Portland Departure, OSU 
037, out of 2000 for 9000. 
OSU 037, turn left heading 
250. 
OSU 037, turn left heading 
210, maintain speed 260. 112 
EVENTS 
OSU 037 at 8000 
(hdg: 210, spd: 260, ALT: 
15000)  FLT F 
OSU 037 approaching UBG 
OSU 037 at 14000 
OSU 037 at TOD 
(hdg: 174, SPD: 250, alt: 
14000) - FLT H 
OSU 037 past TOD 
(hdg: 174, spd: 260, ALT: 
9000) 
OSU 037 at CVO 
OSU 037 at 10000. 
OSU 037 at HORTE 
(HDG: 060, spd: 210, alt: 
4000) - FLT I 
OSU 037 at 4000 
ATC 
OSU 037, contact Seattle 
Center 125.8. 
OSU 037, Seattle Center, 
climb and maintain 1-4­
thousand. GC- ALT: 
150001. 
OSU 037, Seattle Center, 
turn left heading 1-7-4. 
OSU 037, increase speed 
to 3-1-0. 
OSU 037, reduce speed to 
2-6-0. 
JGC-SPD: 2501. 
OSU 037, Descend and 
maintain 1-0-thousand. 
JGC-ALT: 90001. 
OSU 037, turn right 
heading 1-7-7. 
OSU 037, contact Cascade 
Approach 133.0. 
OSU 037,Cascade 
Approach, descend and 
maintain 7000. 
Reduce speed to 2-1-0. 
OSU 037, descend and 
maintain 4000. Turn left 
heading 0-7-0. 
JGC-HDG: 0601. 
OSU 037, 5 miles from 
HOCUM, turn right heading 
1-6-0. Descend and 
maintain 3000 until 
established on the localizer. 
Cleared ILS runway 16 for 
approach. 
OSU 037 
Seattle Center, OSU 037 out 
of 8000 for 9000 
OSU 037 climb and maintain 
14000. 
Maintain current heading 174 
OSU 037, increase speed to 
310. 
OSU 037, reduce speed to 
260 
OSU 037, descend to 10000. 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
177. 
Cascade Approach, OSU 
037, at 10000 with BRAVO. 
OSU 037, descend to 7000 
and reduce speed to 210 
OSU 037, descend and 
maintain 4000. Turn left 
heading 070 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
160, maintain 3000 til 
established. Cleared ILS 
runway 16 113 
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Appendix C - Eugene to Portland Scenario - SCENARIO #1 
OSU 037 FMC Plane Eugene-Portland Scenario 
2/7/97 
Initial Conditions:	  Lat/Long  44.07/123.13 
Alt  365 MSL  Freq -- 121.7 Mhz 
Spd -- 0 KIAS  Hdg -- 210 MAG (Runway 21) 
Flaps 
EVENTS 
OSU 037, ready for 
clearance delivery 
OSU 037, ready for take-off. 
OSU 037 parking brake off , 
full  throttle, and takes-off. 
OSU 037 landing gear up 
OSU 037 at 1400 
OSU 037 at 2500 
OSU 037 at 4000 
n/a 
ATC 
OSU 037, Eugene Ground. 
Cleared to Portland via 
Eugene 4 departure, 
Corvallis, Victor 495. Climb 
and maintain 9000. Expect 
14000 5 minutes after 
departure. Increase speed 
to 2-1-0, during take-off. 
OSU 037, Eugene Tower, 
runway 2-1, cleared for 
take-off. 
OSU 037 contact Departure 
OSU 037, Eugene 
Departure, radar contact. 
Turn right heading 2-9-0. 
OSU 037, turn right 
heading 3-3-0. Increase 
speed to 2-6-0. Alt. 
indicates 3500. 
OSU 037 
Cleared to Portland via 
Eugene 4 departure, 
Corvallis, Victor 495. Maintain 
9000, expecting 14000 5 
minutes after departure. 
Eugene Tower, OSU 037, 
ready for take-off on runway 
21. 
Cleared for take-off on 
Runway 21. 
Eugene Departure, OSU 
037, out of 1500 for 9000. 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
290 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
330, maintain speed 260. 117 
EVENTS 
OSU 037 at 8000 
(hdg: 330, spd: 260, ALT: 
15000) - FLT B 
OSU 037 approaching CVO 
OSU 037 at 14000 
(hdg: 357, SPD: 320, alt: 
14000) - FLT C 
OSU 037 at TOD 
(hdg: 352, spd: 260, ALT: 
9000) 
OSU 037 at UBG 
OSU 037 at 10000. 
OSU 037 at 7000 
(HDG: 020, spd: 210, alt: 
4000) - FLT D 
OSU 037 at 4000 
ATC 
OSU 037, contact Seattle 
Center 125.8. 
OSU 037, Seattle Center, 
climb and maintain 1-4­
thousand. JGC- ALT: 
150001. 
OSU 037, Seattle Center, 
turn right heading 3-5-7. 
OSU 037, increase speed 
to 3-1-0. 
(GC- SPD: 3201. 
OSU 037, reduce speed to 
2-6-0, descend at pilot's 
discretion. Descend and 
maintain 1-0-thousand. 
JGC- ALT: 90001. 
OSU 037, turn left heading 
3-3-4. 
OSU 037, contact Portland 
Approach 133.0. 
OSU 037, turn right 
heading 3-6-0. 
OSU 037, Portland 
Approach, descend and 
maintain 7000. Reduce 
speed to 2-1-0. 
OSU 037, descend and 
maintain 4000. Turn right 
heading 0-1-0. (GC- HDG: 
0201. 
OSU 037, 5 miles from 
YORKY, turn right heading 
0-7-0. Descend and 
maintain 3000 until 
established on the localizer. 
Cleared ILS runway lOR for 
approach. 
OSU 037 
Seattle Center, OSU 037 out 
of 8000 for 9000. 
OSU 037 climb and maintain 
14000. 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
354. 
OSU 037, maintain speed 
290. 
OSU 037, reduce speed to 
260, descend to 10000. 
OSU 037, turn left heading 
334. 
Portland Approach, OSU 
037, at 10000 with BRAVO. 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
360 
OSU 037, descend to 7000 
and reduce speed to 210 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
010, descend and maintain 
4000 
OSU 037, turn right heading 
070, maintain 3000 til 
established. Cleared ILS 
runway 10R 118  Scenario 1  Eugene to Portland 
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APPENDIX D - OSU Internal Review Board Documents 
Evaluation of an Agenda Manager Interface
 
Supplement to an application for the approval of the OSU IRB 12 July 1996
 
1. Significance of Project 
In previous studies we have found that a significant number of commercial aircraft 
incidents and accidents have been caused, in part, by a failure of the flightcrew to properly 
manage their activities. These failures occur when pilots fail to initiate activities at the 
appropriate time, misprioritize them, or fail to terminate them properly. To facilitate the 
management of cockpit activities we have developed a computational aid called the 
AgendaManager (AM). We demonstrated that an early version of the AM could help 
pilots improve activity management in a simulated aircraft environment provided that the 
AM could determine the pilot Ds goals and communicate aiding information to him/her. 
The purpose of this study, which is part of a larger research project supported by the 
NASA Ames Research Center, is to evaluate two subsystems that have been developed to 
make sure that these two assumptions are valid. The Goal Communication Method 
(GCM) is a subsystem that uses voice recognition and artificial intelligence concepts to 
recognize pilot goals declared explicitly (by voice) and implicitly (by control actions). The 
AgendaManager Interface (AMI) is a set of displays designed to present information 
developed by the AM about activity scheduling and prioritization. The questions we are 
trying to answer are "Does the GCM reliably recognize pilot goals in a simulated 
environment?" and "Which version of the AMI is most effective in presenting activity 
management recommendations?" This study is a prelude to a full evaluation of the AM 
planned for late 1996 or early 1997 (for which a separate application for approval will be 
submitted). 
Success in this study will be a small but important step toward improving flight safety. 
2. Methods and Procedures 
The AgendaManager is integrated into a part-task flight simulator that models a two-
engine commercial jet transport with autoflight systems. The simulator runs on a Silicon 
Graphics Indigo 2 UNIX-based workstation. Subjects will interact with the system via a 
mouse and/or BG system flybox (three degree of freedom joystick with integrated buttons 
and levers). The BG flybox includes a left and right engine thrust lever, parking brake 
button, landing gear button, and a roll and pitch control stick (yaw is disabled). The 
AgendaManager was developed using ParcPlace VisualWorks 2.5 and is connected to the 
simulator by socket connections. 
Subjects will declare flight and subsystem management goals explicitly by utterances using 
a microphone. An automatic speech recognition system (ASR) with continuous speaker-
dependent capability developed by Verbex (a VAT31) will interpret their utterances. The 122 
Verbex system will require a 20 minute voice `training session in which subjects will 
read back 250 pre-defined phrases (i.e. 'Climb to 20000 ).  Subjects will also declare 
goals implicitly via an intent inferencing mechanism based on the their control inputs (e.g., 
pulling back on the control stick). These declared goals, as recognized by the 
Agenda Manager will be presented to the subject on the associated Agenda Manager 
Interface assigned to the particular experimental run. 
The experimenters will train each subject in the operation of the part-task simulator and 
the GCM as well as the interpretation of the AgendaManager Interface displays. This 
training will take approximately one to two hours. 
During each experimental run, subjects will perform aircraft control and system 
management tasks in a simulated flight scenario (e.g., Portland to Eugene). The balanced 
experimental design will assign each subject to a series of runs using the Goal 
Communication Method (GCM), scenario, and type of AgendaManager Interface (AMI) 
as factors. Software will track and record subject flight control, subsystems management, 
and agenda management performance, as well as AgendaManager state information. The 
experimental runs will be video taped. The camera will be positioned to record portions 
of the computer screen and the subjects 0 manual control actions. 
Following each experimental run, one of the experimenters will review the video tape with 
the subject, asking him, her to explain his/her intent at various points in the scenario. The 
subject will also be asked to provide assessments of the effectiveness of GCM in capturing 
his/her intent and the effectiveness of the AMI in presenting helpful agenda management 
information. 
3. Benefits and Risks to Subjects 
Subjects will gain a better understanding of the technologies employed in modern 
commercial jet aircraft. They will learn basic human factors engineering concepts and how 
these principles may be applied in system design. Some of these principles may be 
applicable in their daily lives. 
Subjects will receive no compensation in any form for their participation other than that 
described in the previous paragraph. There will be no rewards promised or given for 
"good" performance and no penalties threatened or given for "poor" performance. 
Any risks to the subjects will be minimal. There may be periods of psychological stress 
while the subjects are performing multiple concurrent tasks, however the amount of stress 
experienced should be equivalent to that encountered while playing a video game. 
4. Subject Population 
Ten to twenty licensed pilots will be used for the study. The subjects will be recruited 
primarily from the OSU Flying Club and the Corvallis Municipal Airport. Graduate 123 
research assistants Woo Chang Cha and Robert Wilson will recruit and train subjects and 
will conduct the experiments. 
5. Informed Consent 
A copy of the current version of the informed consent document is attached. The 
researchers will notify the IRB of any changes. 
6. Method for Obtaining Informed Consent 
The researchers will contact subject candidates and ask if they are willing to participate in 
the study following a briefing about the project and experiment. An informed consent 
form will be given to the subject, and after reading it, the subject will be asked to sign if 
they want to be part of the study. Signed consent forms will be collected prior to running 
the experiment. 
7. Method for Maintaining Anonymity/Confidentiality 
Any information pertaining to the subjects identities will not be used in the study. A 
randomly generated identification number will be assigned to each individual and used to 
record associated data. All records will be destroyed after being stored in a confidential 
manner under the researchers supervision for three years. 
8. Questionnaire
 
We do not plan to use a questionnaire.
 
9. Other Approvals
 
No other approvals are required.
 
10. Proposal
 
This is not part of a proposal.
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Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering
 
Oregon State University
 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
I understand that this study involves research sponsored by NASA and is being conducted 
by Robert Wilson, a graduate student at Oregon State University under the supervision of 
Dr. Ken Funk of the Industrial & Manufacturing Engineering Department. I also 
understand that this experiment will use my aviation knowledge and skills to perform 
cockpit task management within a computer-based flight simulator environment. After a 
two hour training session I will fly a set of flight scenarios in order to test the effectiveness 
of AgendaManager Interface (AMT) formats. The entire experiment should last no longer 
than four hours. I will also complete both a pre-experiment and post-experiment 
questionnaire for data analysis purposes. 
I am aware that this is an unpaid experiment. Although physiological risks during the 
experiment are minimal, I understand that a level of psychological stress comparable to 
playing a video game will be experienced during the experiment. While the experiment is 
being run, the evaluator will video tape the flight operation and ask questions for data 
collection purposes. The video tape will never be used for anything other than the current 
study. 
My identification (name, sex, age, etc..) will not be recorded or released to any other 
persons, organizations, or publications. All references to subjects in this study will be 
encoded and kept confidential, and all identity related information destroyed within three 
years of the experiment. 
Any questions concerning aspects or rights related to this experiment should be directed to 
Robert Wilson, or Dr. Ken Funk at 541-737-2357. I understand that Oregon State 
University does not provide compensation or medical treatment in the event the subject is 
injured as a result of this experiment. 
I understand that participation is voluntary, and my refusal to participate will not result in 
penalties or loss of benefits that I am otherwise entitled. My signature below indicates 
that I have read and that I understand the procedures described above and give my 
informed and voluntary consent to participate in this study. I understand that I will 
receive a signed copy of this consent form. 125 
Subject's Name 
Subject's Signature 
Date Signed 
Subject's Phone Number 
Subject's Address 126 
Pre- Experiment Questionnaire 
1. Approximately how many hours have you flown? 
2. Are you instrument rated? 
3. Do you have an illness (e.g., cold) that may effect your performance today? 
4. Did you get your usual amount of sleep last night? 
5. Are you on any medications that could effect performance (e.g., cold medicine)? 
6. Are there any other factors that you can think of that could effect your performance? 127 
Post - Experiment Questionnaire 
1. Which Agenda Manager display did you prefer (text page only or text page plus 
graphics [arrows] on the primary flight display)? Why? 
2. Please rate the relative effectiveness/helpfulness of the AgendaManager displays (-10 
to +10) with -10 representing a hindrance, 0 representing 'no help', and 10 representing 
significant help. 
Text Page Alone  Text Page with PFD Graphics 
Effectiveness? 
3. Were the instructions given clear? Please comment? 
4. Did you have any difficulties? 
5. Do you have any general comments and/or recommendations? 128 
APPENDIX E - EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
 129 
Appendix E - Experimental Data 
Table A.1 Final data sheet 
Subject 1  runl  run2 
Score Score 
Prioritization  100% 100% 
Flying Performance  9.8  9.3 
subsys goal perf  15.3  21.8 
goal conflicts  41.0  50.3 
baseline rating  5.0 
alternate rating  10.0 
runl: scenariol; baseline display 
run2: scenario2; alternate display 
instrument rated? NO 
Subject 2  runl  run2 
Score Score 
Prioritization  100% 100% 
Flying Performance  5.9  11.5 
subsys goal perf  18.0  13.2 
goal conflicts  43.5  33.8 
baseline rating  7.0 
alternate rating  5.0 
runl: scenariol; baseline display 
run2: scenario2; alternate display 
instrument rated? NO 
Subject 3  runl  run2 
Score Score 
Prioritization  100% 75% 
Flying Performance  11.2  7.4 
subsys goal perf  20.3  13.3 
goal conflicts  45.7  27.3 
baseline rating  10.0 
alternate rating  0.0 
run 1: scenario2; baseline display 
run2: scenariol; alternate display 
instrument rated? YES 
Subject 5  runl  run2 
Score Score 
Prioritization  100% 80% 
Flying Performance  5.2  18.7 
subsys goal perf  16.8  32.8 
goal conflicts  48.3  37.3 
baseline rating  10.0 
alternate rating  0.0 
runl: scenariol; alternate display 
run2: scenario2; baseline display 
instrument rated? YES 
Subject 6  runl  run2 
Score Score 
Prioritization  100% 100% 
Flying Performance  12.1  10.4 
subsys goal perf  36.5  19.0 
goal conflicts  37.3  19.3 
baseline rating  8.0 
alternate rating  3.0 
runl: scenariol; alternate display 
run2: scenario2; baseline display 
instrument rated? YES 
Subject 7 
Prioritization 
Flying Performance 
subsys goal perf 
goal conflicts 
baseline rating 
alternate rating 
runl  run2 
Score Score 
100% 100% 
9.5  6.0 
24.8  16.8 
37.0  40.8 
7.0 
8.0 
runl: scenario2; alternate display 
run2: scenariol; baseline display 
instrument rated? NO 130 
Table A.1 Final data sheet (Continued) 
Subject 4  runl  run2  Subject 8  runl  run2 
Score  Score  Score Score 
Prioritization  100%  75%  Prioritization  60%  75% 
Flying Performance  8.9  10.4  Flying Performance  7.2  9.5 
subsys goal perf  30.5  19.3  subsys goal perf  15.3  16.6 
goal conflicts  38.5  34.8  goal conflicts  32.8  27.8 
baseline rating  8.0  baseline rating  8.0 
alternate rating  10.0  alternate rating  8.0 
runl: scenario2; baseline display  runl: scenario2; alternate display 
run2: scenario1; alternate display  run2: scenariol; baseline display 
instrument rated? YES  instrument rated? NO 
Table A.2 Subject display effectiveness ratings (-10 to 10 scale) 
subject  text display  text with graphic enhancements 
1 5  10 
2 7  5 
3 10  0 
4 8  10 
5 10  0 
6 8  3 
7 7  8 
8 8  8 131 
Table A.3 Flying performance average (seconds) 
subject  experimental runl 
1  9.8 
2  5.9 
3  11.2 
4  8.9 
5  5.2 
6  12.1 
7  9.5 
8  7.2 
experimental run2
 
9.3
 
11.5
 
7.4
 
10.4
 
18.7
 
10.4
 
6
 
9.5 
Table A.4 Subsystem goal performance average (seconds) 
subject  experimental runl 
1  15.3 
2  18 
3  20.3 
4  30.5 
5  16.8 
6  36.5 
7  24.8 
8  15.3 
experimental run2
 
21.8
 
13.2
 
13.3
 
19.3
 
32.8
 
19
 
16.8 
16.6 132 
Table A.5 Goal conflict resolution average (seconds) 
subject  experimental runl 
1  41 
2  43.5 
3  45.7 
4  38.5 
5  48.3 
6  37.3 
7  37 
8  32.8 
experimental run2 
50.3 
33.8 
27.3 
34.8 
37.3 
19.3 
40.8 
27.8 
Table A.6 Correct subsystem goal prioritization (percent) 
subject  experimental runl 
1  100 
2  100 
3  100 
4  100 
5  100 
6  100 
7  100 
8  60 
experimental run2
 
100
 
100
 
75
 
75
 
80
 
100
 
100
 
75
 